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Abstract. When judges change the legal rules governing patents, those changes are 
always retroactive. That is, they apply equally to patents that have already been granted 
and patents that do not yet exist. There are benefits to making a change in the law 
retroactive, particularly if the new legal rule is an improvement over what preceded it. But 
there are costs as well. Retroactive changes in the law upset reliance interests. This can be 
particularly harmful when those reliance interests involve rights or entitlements that 
form the basis for substantial financial investment, as is often the case with patents. What 
is more, judges are aware that their decisions can do violence to existing reliance interests. 
This makes judges wary of making changes to patent law in the first place, which can lead 
to the law becoming stultified. Reducing the rate of legal change is not an adequate 
solution. Neither is takings law, which is commonly applied to solve similar problems that 
arise in the context of real property but is a poor fit for intellectual property. Rather, to 
ameliorate the reliance concerns generated by legal change, federal judges should be 
afforded the latitude to make their rulings purely prospective. And patent judges should 
exercise this discretion in the many cases where forward-looking change is called for but 
backward-looking change would do more harm than good.
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Introduction
“[Sjuppose that the patent has been in existence without anybody reexamin­
ing it fo r  10 years and, moreover, the com pany’s invested $40 billion in 
developing it. A nd  then suddenly somebody comes in and says: Oh, o h ,. . .  we 
want it reexamined, not in court but by the Patent Office. Now, that seems 
perhaps that it would be a problem . . .  ?”
—Justice Stephen Breyer1
“I f  I  were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I  m ight conclude that an 
isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all o f  a gene is not patentable 
subject m atter.. . .  B u t we do not decide this case on a blank canvas. Congress 
has, fo r  centuries, authorized an expansive scope o f  patentable subject 
m atter .. . .  I  believe we m ust be particularly wary o f  expanding the judicial 
exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and 
extensive property rights are involved.”
—Judge Kimberly Ann Moore2
Consider the following scenario. The judges of the Federal Circuit are 
faced with the question whether a particular type of biologic invention 
constitutes patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act.3 The judges 
have become convinced, for reasons of law or policy, that the invention should 
not be patentable under § 101.4 But holding as much would mean overturning 
decades-old circuit precedent, under which the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) has granted (and the courts have upheld) tens of thousands of 
existing patents. Dozens of major businesses have been founded on the basis of 
those patents, and billions of dollars of investment capital have flowed to the 
businesses because of them. Changing the law would risk upending the 
businesses and, worse, invalidating the patents might deter future investments 
in research and development (R&D). Future innovators and investors might be 
much more reluctant to pursue patent-based research if they have reason to 
fear that the Federal Circuit will pull the rug out from under them.
This problem is fundamental to any area of law in which investment 
decisions are made on the basis of expectations regarding the stability and 
reliability of legal rights. But it is of particular significance and salience within
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712), 2017 WL 8231974.
2. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), affd in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
4. This example is, of course, the scenario addressed by Judge Moore. See supra text 
accompanying note 2.
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the realm of patent law.5 Patents exist for the purpose of promoting 
innovation,6 and they do so by granting legal rights to innovators that allow 
them to capture significant financial returns by making and selling their 
inventions.7 If patent rights become unreliable or unstable, the purpose and 
function of the patent system will be undermined. Put another way, the 
bargain between the government and an inventor is that the latter publicizes 
her invention in exchange for a legal monopoly of limited time. If courts later 
revoke the inventor’s benefit from that bargain, how likely will she be to enter 
into a similar exchange the next time, particularly where trade secret 
protection is a practical alternative?8
Moreover, at least in recent years, patent law has undergone a more rapid 
series of legal changes than nearly any other area of law, and certainly any 
other area of property law. Between 2010 and 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided four major cases that reconfigured the boundaries defining which 
types of inventions may be patented and which may not.9 And this merely 
scratches the surface; there are many other Supreme Court decisions and 
hundreds of appellate cases that have reshaped patent law in various ways.10 
An area of law that depends upon legal stability has become notably unstable.
This is the issue described by Justice Breyer and Judge Moore in this 
Article’s epigraph. Justice Breyer’s comment, made during oral argument in
5. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the M iddle o f  the Game: How the Prospective 
Application o f  Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote Economic 
Efficiency, 41 Am. BUS. L.J. 1, 21 (2003) (‘‘Although property rights in general merit 
special consideration when it comes to retroactivity in judicial decision making, the 
case that can be made for intellectual property is even more convincing.”).
6. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
7. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case fo r  Tailoring Patent A w ards Based on Time-to-Market, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 749 (2014) (“[P]atents promote innovation by allowing patentees 
to appropriate a greater portion of the social returns from their inventions — ”).
8. This is far from speculative. In fact, there is evidence that the burden of 
public disclosure discouraged patenting even before recent upheavals in the 
law of patentability. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business M ethod  
Patent M yth , 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1005 n.51 (2003) (“[M]ost research and 
development executives view trade secrets and other means as superior to patents in 
appropriating returns on R&D investment.”).
9. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-60 (2014) (holding that many 
types of business methods and software inventions may not be patented); Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 590-95 (2013) (holding that 
isolated DNA is unpatentable but complementary DNA (cDNA) is patentable); Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77-80 (2012) (holding that 
certain types of diagnostic medical tests are unpatentable); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593,609-12 (2010) (holding that certain business methods are unpatentable).
10. See infra  notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LEG, addresses the 
perceived problem created when patents are invalidated via administrative 
proceedings before the PTO.11 But the problem is more general: Whenever the 
PTO or a court invalidates a patent—or a major change in the law invalidates 
thousands of patents—it reduces firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. How 
should courts respond in the face of this hazard?13 One option is suggested by 
Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in A ssn  fo r  Molecular Pathology v. United 
States Patent & Tradem ark Office. Courts could adhere more rigidly to stare 
decisis and simply alter the law less often.13 Yet this approach is often a poor fit 
for patent law, where the law must be frequently updated if it is to keep pace 
with changes in technology and markets.14 It is also ill-suited to a system in 
which only one court of appeals handles patent cases, thus eliminating the 
possibility of circuit splits. Without a circuit split to signal the Supreme Court, 
long periods of time may pass before the Court addresses important questions 
of patent law.15
Another possibility would be for courts to treat changes in patent law that 
weaken existing patents as judicial takings that must be compensated. In Stop 
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department o f  Environm ental Protection, a 
plurality of the Supreme Court held that property can be taken for purposes of 
the Takings Clause by judicial decisions that overturn well-established 
property rules.16 Applying takings law to patent cases would provide a type of
11. See supra text accompanying note 1; see also Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s 
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
12. Our focus in this Article is on the courts—the primary expositors of patent law. But the 
point is general to any institution that has a role in shaping patent law. As PTO 
Director Andrei Iancu said at his swearing-in ceremony: “[Wje must endeavor to 
provide reliable, predictable, and high-quality [intellectual property] rights that give 
owners and the public alike confidence in those rights.” Andrei Iancu, Under Sec’y of 
Commerce for Intellectual Prop. & Director, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks 
at the Ceremonial Swearing-In (Feb. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q7R5-U6CM.
13. See 689 F.3d 1303, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), a ffd  in part, rev’d 
in p art sub nom. M yriad, 569 U.S. 576.
14. See Thomas F. Cotter, A  Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
855,878-79 (2007) (“Patent law must keep pace with the times.. . .”).
15. There are areas of patent law the Supreme Court has not addressed for quite some time, 
including the enablement and written description requirements of § 112 of the Patent 
Act. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345-47 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(en banc) (citing older Supreme Court cases interpreting § 112); id. at 1364 n * (Rader, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that the Supreme Court in a recent 
decision hardly purported to resolve the present question” regarding the requirements 
of § 112), see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2017). Just as A ssn  fo r  Molecular Pathology v. M yriad  
Genetics, Inc. potentially invalidated thousands of patents in a single stroke, see 569 U.S. 
at 590-95, so too could a ruling changing the law on written description or enablement.
16. See 560 U.S. 702, 713-15 (2010) (plurality opinion); see also U.S. CONST, amend. V (“[N]or 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
967
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity 
71 Stan. L. Rev. 963 (2019)
governmental insurance for patentholders and guarantee that courts could not 
undermine investment-backed reliance interests by changing the law. Here 
too, however, the cure would be worse than the disease. If changes to patent 
law were classified as judicial takings, legal change would become impossible 
or prohibitively expensive. Takings law could also distort the path of legal 
change if judges favor (or disfavor) patents protected by takings law.
A different approach is called for. Instead of stasis or treating changes to 
patent law as takings, federal courts—or at least patent courts—should be given 
the authority to hand down decisions that are prospective only. That is, they 
should have the power to determine that a particular decision affects only 
patents whose owners applied for them on or after the date of that decision. 
Nonretroactive lawmaking is a mechanism frequently employed by both 
Congress and agencies to mitigate the downsides of legal transitions.17 
Presenting judges with this option would decouple a judicial decision’s 
prospective effect—which is presumptively positive—from the backward­
looking harm it might do to investment-backed expectations and reliance 
interests. This would provide courts with an avenue for updating legal rules 
without doing violence to the stable legal rights necessary to encourage 
ongoing investment in R&D. Patent law would become more dynamic and less 
hidebound. It would also become more effective.
There is even an existing model for this type of judicial flexibility: the law 
of habeas corpus. When the Supreme Court recognizes a constitutional 
criminal procedural right, that ruling generally does not apply retroactively to 
all prisoners who were convicted under the prior rules. Rather, under the rule 
announced by a plurality of the Court in Teague v. Lane18 and subsequently 
codified by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA),19 newly announced procedural rights do not apply to convictions
17. See infra  text accompanying notes 166-69. By contrast, courts are by far the dominant 
expositors of patent law. Administrative agencies do not have substantive rulemaking 
authority within the patent realm, and Congress has not made significant substantive 
changes to patent law in over sixty years (the America Invents Act made only a variety 
of procedural changes). See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YaleL.J.470, 472 (2011), 
Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. Ct . Rev. 275, 279; see also Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). One of us has argued that this state of affairs should 
be altered, with more power afforded agencies to make substantive patent law. See 
Masur, Regulating Patents, supra, at 279. For purposes of this Article, however, we take 
this institutional arrangement as given.
18. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017) (providing that habeas relief is only available when a 
state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States 
(emphasis added)); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 104,110 Stat. 1214,1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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that are already final.20 Thus, when the Supreme Court creates a new rule of 
criminal procedure, that rule applies only quasi-prospectively: to future cases 
and cases pending on direct appeal, not to the thousands (or tens of thousands) 
more in which the conviction is final and the prisoner seeks habeas relief.
Habeas is the only area of law in which quasi-prospective judicial lawmak­
ing has become common, but it need not be.21 Indeed, nonretroactive 
lawmaking is a staple of legislation and regulation, and thus it pervades most 
areas of federal law.22 Patent law, by contrast, is one of the few areas of federal 
law governed primarily by judicial decisions rather than statutes or 
regulations.23 It makes no sense to deprive the patent system of a critical legal 
tool available in so many other legal fields, particularly when this tool’s value 
is potentially greatest in the context of patents and the innovation economy.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I analyzes the problems created by 
changes in patent law—even changes that produce marked improvements in 
the law. Part II considers the possibility that judges should respond by adhering 
more strictly to stare decisis and reducing the rate of legal change, eventually 
concluding that such a course would be ill-advised. Part III addresses takings 
law as a potential solution, rejecting it as an overly rigid and asymmetric 
response to a symmetric problem. Finally, Part IV suggests that judges should 
solve the problem of damage to investment-backed reliance interests by issuing 
purely prospective patent rulings, and then analyzes the costs and benefits of 
such an approach.
I. Patents and Reliance Interests
The goal of patent law is to induce private firms to invest in innovation 
and R&D by granting them quasi-monopoly power over their successful 
inventions in exchange for public disclosure of those inventions.24 Patents,
20. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 (plurality opinion). The potential relationship between 
habeas law and patent law is discussed more fully in Part IV.C.l below.
21. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993) (discussing the 
circumstances under which retroactivity in civil cases is permitted); see also infra 
Part IV.C.1. The qualified immunity defense in civil rights litigation also provides some 
mechanism for quasi-prospective lawmaking. Even if a court finds that an asserted 
constitutional right exists, defendants can establish immunity by showing that the 
right was not “clearly established at the relevant time.” See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 
134S.Q. 2012,2020(2014).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67.
23. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 276-77 (expanding upon this point).
24. See Donald S. Chisum et al., Principles of Patent Law  2-3,6 (1998) (explaining this 
tradeoff); see also Robert Patrick Merges & John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law  
and Policy: Cases and Materials 253-56 (4th ed. 2007) (describing various incentive 
systems believed to drive patent law); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable
footnote continued on next page
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unlike grants or tax incentives, are ex post rewards—the firm invests resources 
first, with the hope that the R&D project will bear fruit and then result in a 
patent.25 The patent then allows the firm to recoup its upfront investment 
costs and turn a profit by charging higher prices for the patented product or 
service.26 Patents can thus solve a public goods problem: Innovation is a public 
good, and it is likely to be underproduced if its producers cannot capture the 
value of their efforts due to the free riding of others.27
As many commentators have noted, this means that patent law must be 
“correct” (or nearly so) if it is to be effective.28 If the law is too lax, and patents 
are too easy to obtain, would-be inventors will spend their time on 
unproductive projects rather than genuine innovation.29 In addition, the 
proliferation of patents on largely worthless inventions might inhibit future 
inventors and drive up prices for consumers to such levels that the patents are 
doing more harm than good.50 On the other hand, if the law is too strict, and 
patents are too hard to obtain, then patents will provide little or no incentive 
to would-be inventors and will not encourage additional innovation.31
But it is not enough for the law to be correct. One of the peculiarities of 
patent law is that it must also be relatively stable. The reason is the lag time
Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. Rev. 863, 867 (2007) (explaining how patents involve a 
tradeoff between innovation and distortions in price).
25. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patent-Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. 
L. REV. 303, 308 (2013) (classifying intellectual property incentive systems on the basis 
of whether they operate ex ante or ex post, among other dimensions).
26. See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 Geo. L.J. 
637,642-43(2013).
27. See David S. Olson, T aking  the Utilitarian Basis f o r  Patent Law Seriously: The Case fo r  
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. Rev. 181,191 -94 (2009).
28. See, e.g., id. at 193-94 (“Thus it is vitally important that the patent laws be properly 
balanced. If the patent laws extend too far, they decrease social utility by allowing more 
harm to society from patent monopoly than is gained by promoting new inventions. If 
the patent laws provide too little protection for inventions, then social utility is 
decreased because inventors do not have adequate incentive to invent.’’); Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory o f  Intellectual Property, 
88 Va. L. Rev. 1455,1504-08 (2002) (suggesting that as patents become too strong or too 
weak, they cease to be helpful and become only a drag on innovation).
29. See Stephen Yelderman, The Value o f  Accuracy in the Patent System, 84 U. CHI. L. Rev. 
1217, 1245-47 (2017) (arguing that granting bad patents will induce firms to substitute 
strategic patenting for genuine innovation).
30. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects o f  Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 
M inn. L. Rev. 101, 119-20 (2006) (describing how invalid patents lead to higher prices 
that harm consumers and benefit initial monopolists); Masur, Patent Inflation, supra 
note 17, at 479-80 ("Invalid, improperly granted patents can dissuade potential 
competitors from entering a market and stunt investment in further research.”).
31. See Yelderman, supra note 29, at 1249 (explaining that denials of patents for otherwise 
patentable inventions diminish inventors’ ex ante incentives).
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between R&D investments and patent rewards. A firm invests in R&D with the 
belief that some number of years down the road, it will be able to recoup those 
investments and turn a profit by leveraging the patents it has obtained.32 Some 
types of inventions, such as pharmaceutical drugs, can be valuable even in their 
twentieth (and final) year of patent life.33 Accordingly, a pharmaceutical drug 
company that embarks on a research project in 2017 must consider what legal 
rights it will have in its inventions in 2037 or beyond.
All of this is to say that firms form reliance interests around patents.34 
They are willing to invest in R&D at time t\ in reliance on the belief that they 
will be able to obtain patents and use those patents to earn profits at time f2.35 
Patent law, however, is not fixed in place. It is continually in flux, occasionally 
because of changes enacted by Congress,36 but more frequently because of 
judicial changes to the common law of patents.37 The Supreme Court alone has
32. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 310-12, 319-20, 326 (explaining the economics 
behind patent-backed investments).
33. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017) (providing that patents last for twenty years); Lara J. 
Glasgow, Stretching the L im its o f  Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 232, 236 (2001) (discussing the substantial financial 
blow pharmaceutical companies suffer within months of the expiration of their 
patents). Congress recognized this particular problem for pharmaceutical patents 
by creating patent term extensions for pharmaceutical products. See Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, sec. 201(a), 
§ 156,98 Stat. 1585,1598-602 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156).
34. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, R eth inking  Patent L aw ’s Presumption o f  Validity, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 52 (2007) (suggesting that patents are presumed valid in part 
because of the reliance interests attached to them); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (providing 
for a presumption of validity).
35. The argument here centers on a reward theory of patent rights, in which the purpose 
of patents is to provide rewards for inventors who have made substantial up-front 
investments in developing new technology. This is the leading theory of patents, 
which is why we make it our focus. But it is important to note that reliance interests 
would loom just as large even if one adopted another theory of patents, such as the 
commercialization theory, see generally Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 
Stan. L. Rev. 341 (2010); the coordination theory, see generally Stephen Yelderman, 
Coordination-Focused Patent Policy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1565 (2016); the prospect theory, 
see generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function o f  the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977); or the signaling theory, see generally Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 625 (2002).
36. See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 285-93 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (changing U.S. patent 
rights from a “first to invent” system to a “first inventor to file” system).
37. See Holly Forsberg, Note, D im inishing the Attractiveness o f  Trolling: The Impacts o f  Recent 
Judicial A ctivity  on Non-Practicing Entities, Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 12-13 (Fall 2011) 
(discussing the recent trend in patent law of judicial change rather than legislative 
reform).
971
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity
71 Stan. L. Rev. 963 (2019)
decided forty patent cases since 2005,38 while the Federal Circuit has decided 
hundreds of cases during that time, many of which have revised the law in 
significant ways.39
Each time a court or Congress changes patent law, it damages these 
existing reliance interests. This, in turn, can lead to less R&D investment, as 
measured against the baseline of how firms would behave if the law were static. 
Paradoxically, the social harm that occurs is not to existing patentholders, the 
ones whose legal rights are actually affected. These firms, which possess 
patents, have already engaged in the innovation that patent law is meant to 
encourage. Their R&D dollars have already been spent. The social good that 
patent law is meant to encourage—greater investment in R&D and 
innovation—has already occurred within these firms. If a firm’s existing 
patents are invalidated or made less valuable, there is certainly private harm to 
that firm. But from a static, social perspective, this is just a wealth transfer 
from the firm to the general public. No harm has occurred.40
Rather, when the law changes and reliance interests are damaged, the 
social harm that occurs is due to the fact that fu ture  innovators cannot be 
certain that the law will preserve their prospective patent rights. If patent law 
is generally unstable, innovative firms (or investors) may fear that they will 
never recoup their R&D investments and therefore refrain from making those 
investments in the first place. Alternatively, they may hold their innovations 
as trade secrets and refrain from sharing them with the public.41 Either of these
38. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette et al., Supreme Court Patent Cases, W RITTEN DESCRIPTION, 
https://perma.cc/2DQV-VQFU (archived Mar. 3,2019). One additional case was argued 
in February 2019 and is currently pending before the Supreme Court. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 17-1594 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2019), 
2019 W L  719101.
39. See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Year-to-Date Activity as of December 31, 
2017 (n.d.), https://perma.cc/6TLG-8C5M. For significant examples, see Ariad 
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (written 
description requirement); Janssen Pharmaceutica N.V. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. (In re 
’318 Patent Infringement Litig.), 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (enablement require­
ment); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (damages); and 
Phillips v. AWF1 Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (claim construction).
40. This follows from the fact that patents represent a tradeoff between dynamic efficiency 
(innovation) and static inefficiency (monopoly prices, hold-up concerns, and so forth). 
See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 28, at 1504-08. If the innovation has already 
occurred, then the dynamic efficiency has already been realized. Invalidating the patent 
at that point imposes no further social harm.
41. See Neil M. Goodman, Note, Patent Licensee Standing and the Declaratory Judgm ent Act, 83 
Colum. L. Rev. 186, 212-13 (1983). A trade secret is a relevant piece of business 
information that a firm elects to maintain as a secret, rather than sharing it with the 
public (as is a precondition of obtaining a patent). See id. Trade secrets can, in theory, 
last indefinitely if the secret is never discovered. Id. at 213. But they can also evaporate 
quickly if a member of the public is able to reverse engineer the product and learn the 
secret.
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approaches would slow the pace of technological advancement. An unstable 
patent law threatens to reinstate the problem of public goods and free riding 
that motivates patent law in the first place.
There are clear analogies to the law of real property and to industrial 
regulation that are instructive and highly relevant. Imagine that a firm is 
considering building a factory on a piece of land it owns that is zoned for 
industrial use. The upfront cost of the factory is large, but the firm expects to 
recoup the cost and turn a profit by selling the goods produced in the factory 
over a twenty-year period. Of course, if at some point in the subsequent twenty 
years the firm were to be stripped of its ownership interest in the land on 
which the factory is built, the firm’s investment in the factory would be 
destroyed and the firm would suffer a substantial loss. Likewise for the zoning 
rule—if the property were to be rezoned for only residential use, preventing 
the factory from operating, the firm would be harmed.42 The firm is willing to 
make the upfront investment of constructing the factory only if it is confident 
that the laws governing its property will remain relatively stable over time.43
Similarly, imagine that a particular Chemical X  is essential to the produc­
tion processes planned for this factory. Chemical X  is currently thought to be 
quite safe and is regulated only loosely. It is always possible, however, that 
scientists will learn at some point that Chemical X  is in fact quite dangerous, 
and that the Environmental Protection Agency or the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration will move to regulate it more stringently 44 If the firm 
is required to install safety equipment or take other precautions, this will eat 
into its profits but not destroy the value of its investment; if Chemical X  is 
banned entirely, the value of the factory will be lost. Here, too, the firm is 
reliant upon relative stability in the regulatory regime surrounding 
Chemical X, which potentially involves both legal uncertainty and scientific
42. See Cullen Christie Wilkerson, Comment, Just Compensation for Temporary Regulatory 
Takings: A Discussion of Factors Influencing Damage Awards, 35 Emory L.J. 729, 765-72 
(1986) (discussing the economic harm from rezoning property after it has been 
developed).
43. See Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 
Duke L.J. 1, 26 (2004) (“[Property creates incentives for development by identifying 
those who have claims to particular resources and thereby ensuring that they can 
appropriate the fruits of their efforts to cultivate these resources.”).
44. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. Rev. 87, 119-25 (2016) (describing how 
regulators may assess the use of a harmful pollutant in the workplace).
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uncertainty (that is, the possibility that new facts regarding the dangerousness 
of Chemical X  will be discovered).45 The same dynamics apply with respect to 
patent law.46
Importantly, legal instability can upset reliance interests and create 
problems of inadequate investment regardless of whether the change in the law 
is generally helpful or harmful. What matters are the expectations of the 
private firms that make investment decisions 47 So long as a change in the law 
leads them to believe that other changes may be forthcoming and may 
negatively affect their future investments, they will be more inclined to refrain 
from making those investments. For instance, consider the Supreme Court’s 
2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., which 
invalidated certain types of medical diagnostic tests as unpatentable under 
§ 101 of the Patent Act48 Let us stipulate that Mayo was rightly decided as a 
matter of policy—that the patent system will function better if these types of 
inventions are not patentable.49 Firms that observe the Mayo decision might 
nonetheless conclude that the courts will render further decisions of this type 
in the future, decisions in which they declare certain types of inventions
45. Private insurance against legal change or uncertainty is essentially impossible to 
obtain. See Jonathan S. Masur & Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional D ynam ics o f  
Transition Relief, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391,408 (2010).
46. This is particularly the case in certain fields, such as biotechnology. For example, the 
ability to satisfy the written description requirement by depositing an actual specimen 
of biological material has been hotly contested. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen- 
Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 960-61, 963-67 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that such a deposit 
satisfies the written description requirement). The Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether deposits can satisfy the written description requirement, and if it overturned 
the Federal Circuit on this subject retroactively, the decision would likely have a 
profound effect on the biotechnology industry. That is, of course, if the Supreme Court 
agrees that a separate written description requirement even exists. Cf. Ariad 
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., 
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (arguing that there is no such separate 
requirement).
47. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: A n  Equilibrium Approach, 110 H a r v . L. 
R e v . 1055, 1105 (1997) (describing the relationship between private parties' expecta­
tions and their behavior).
48. See 566 U.S. 66,72 (2012).
49. This is debatably true. Compare, e.g., Bernard Chao, M oderating Mayo, 107 Nw. U. L. 
R e v . C o l l o q u y  82, 99 (2012) (supporting the decision), with, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing  
Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/FZ5U-8DL8 (criticizing the decision), and Michael Risch, Patentable 
Subject Matter, the Supreme Court, and Me, MADISONIAN (Mar. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc 
/8PB2-2ZW4 (same).
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unpatentable and thus upend reliance interests.50 If firms fear that the 
innovations they produce will lose value due to future changes in the law, they 
will reduce their investments in R&D accordingly.
However, this certainly does not mean that changes to the law are always 
bad. If a particular legal doctrine is doing substantially more harm than good, 
the value of changing that doctrine may vastly outweigh the cost of unsettling 
expectations. Again, the analogy to real property and regulation is instructive. 
Imagine that, per the example above, scientists discover that even low doses of 
Chemical X  are toxic. Banning Chemical X  will harm the reliance interests of 
firms that are using it, and the change in the law will create uncertainty that 
may dampen future investment. But these negative considerations are dwarfed 
by the value of eliminating a harmful toxin.51 As a general matter, the effects of 
instability on investment should be thought of as a cost to legal change.52 That 
cost may be large in some cases and small in others; it may be outweighed by 
other benefits from the legal change in some cases and not in others. But it will 
exist nearly any time the law is altered.
Changes to patent law most evidently produce investment-related costs 
when courts invalidate existing patents and narrow the scope of what is 
patentable. But in fact, any type of decision that affects patent law can damage 
reliance interests. For instance, a judicial decision reducing the amount of 
damages that can be collected in infringement suits would diminish the value 
of the affected patents.53 If the reduction in damages is substantial enough, it 
could affect firms’ investment decisions.54
Perhaps even more critically, the concerns are symmetric: Judicial deci­
sions that strengthen patents can harm reliance interests just as much as 
decisions that weaken patents. To illustrate, imagine a firm that copies the
50. This outcome has plausibly occurred, see Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 
F.3d 1371, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (invalidating a patent on a prenatal diagnostic test), 
sparking criticism, see, e.g., Dennis Crouch, In Brief. Am ici Provide Reasons to Reconsider 
Ariosa v. Sequenom, Patently- 0  (Aug. 30,2015), https://perma.cc/ECT2-EXFM.
51. See Masur & Posner, supra note 44, at 125 (explaining how these types of costs and 
benefits should be weighed).
52. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. Rev. 437, 439-41 (2011) 
(describing the way in which people can experience harm and incur costs when their 
property rights are upset, or if they believe those rights are unstable).
53. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336-39 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(curtailing the circumstances in which courts may use the “entire market value rule” to 
assess patent damages, and thus reducing the damages that patent plaintiffs will 
receive).
54. On the whole, however, invalidity (and validity) decisions will probably have a greater 
impact on reliance interests, because they can affect the full value of a patent. 
Infringement (or noninfringement) decisions will usually have only a fractional impact 
on patent value, such as if they slightly narrow the scope of the patent or limit the 
amount of damages available.
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business model of a competitor. The firm believes—correctly, for the 
moment—that business models cannot be patented, and thus that it cannot be 
sued for patent infringement by the competitor.55 If the courts were to change 
the law and allow patents on business methods, the reliance interests of this 
firm would be destroyed, no less than if its own patents had been invalidated.56 
Freedom to operate can be just as valuable as the patent-based right to 
exclude.57 Of course, in many cases the reliance interests of these types of firms 
will nonetheless be protected by other provisions of patent law. For instance, 
once a firm has been publicly using a process or producing a good for more 
than one year, that process or good can no longer be patented, and other firms 
using it can no longer lose their freedom to operate.58 But there may be many 
cases in which allowing new types of patents or strengthening existing patents 
does violence to investment incentives in ways that patent law does not 
otherwise prevent. Here, it is the fear that patent law will expand and become 
more powerful that might diminish future investment by firms that do not 
seek patents.
How should courts behave in the face of these concerns? How should they 
behave when any given instance of legal change creates systemic costs? One 
option is to simply refrain from altering the law, or at least to reduce the rate at 
which they do so. That possibility is the subject of the next Part.
II. Reliance Interests and the Preservation of the Status Quo
If legal change harms reliance interests and diminishes investment 
incentives, one solution is for judges to enforce consistency and stability in the 
law—or at least to place a thumb on the scale in favor of the status quo. In fact, 
this approach is as old as the common law itself. Stare decisis is founded on this
55. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612-13 (2010) (holding that certain types of business 
methods are unpatentable).
56. In fact, business methods were unpatentable until the Federal Circuit held that business 
methods were patentable in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. 
See 149 F.3d 1368,1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), affd  sub nom. Bilski, 561 U.S. 593.
57. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and 
Its Implications fo r  the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297,303-04 (2010).
58. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2017).
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principle: Courts are advised to adhere to precedent when in doubt so as not to 
upset settled reliance interests.59 The consequence is that courts will often shy 
away from making substantial legal changes, even when they would have 
reached a different outcome if they were considering the issue as a matter of 
first impression.60 Even during a period of rapid legal change, such as patent 
law has experienced over the past decade, courts may shy away from altering 
the law in ways that seem too sudden or consequential.
Examples of such judicial reticence can be found throughout the law,61 and 
patent law is no exception. One notable instance is Judge Moore’s concurring 
opinion in Assn for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trademark 
Office, a portion of which appears in this Article’s epigraph.62 That famous case 
involved the patentability of isolated sequences of DNA and complementary 
DNA (cDNA).63 In her opinion, Judge Moore argued that both isolated DNA 
and cDNA were patentable, in large part because of the reliance interests that
59. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare 
decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance 
interests are involved. . . .”); see also Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 
1459, 1460 (2013) (noting that the principle of stare decisis is thought to be based on 
concern for reliance interests).
60. See Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best W orld, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1139,1190-91 
(2015) (explaining how stare decisis can lead to outcomes that are inferior to those that 
would have been reached had a court been considering the question as a matter of first 
impression); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A  Constructivist Coherence Theory o f  Constitu­
tional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. Rev. 1189, 1261 (1987) (“Though precedents can be 
rejected based on arguments from text and the framers’ intent, this seldom happens. 
The cases take on a significance of their own.”).
61. Perhaps the most famous application of stare decisis is the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Planned Parenthood o f  Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Court upheld the 
right to abortion it had announced in Roe v. W ade in part because of the reliance 
interests that had formed around that prior decision. See Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (“The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a 
rule’s repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s 
continued application.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. See 689 F.3d 1303,1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), a ffd  in part, rev'd 
in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 
(2013); supra text accompanying note 2.
63. See Ass'n fo r  Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309. Isolated DNA consists of DNA 
sequences that code for particular genes that have been separated from surrounding 
biological materials and from the DNA sequences on either side of them. See Stephen H. 
Schilling, Note, D N A  as Patentable Subject M atter and a Narrow  Framework fo r  Addressing  
the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 Duke L.J. 731, 749-52 (2011). Isolated 
cDNA refers to isolated DNA sequences from which the introns—the base pairs that do 
not contain any usable genetic information—have been removed. See id. at 749-50. Both 
types can form the basis for significant biotechnology inventions. See id. at 752.
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had been built up over the decades during which courts and the PTO had 
allowed patents on these types of inventions.64 Wrote Judge Moore:
If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude that an isolated 
DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject 
matter.. . .  But we do not decide this case on a blank canvas. Congress has, for 
centuries, authorized an expansive scope of patentable subject matter. Likewise, 
the United States Patent Office has allowed patents on isolated DNA sequences for 
decades, and, more generally, has allowed patents on purified natural products for 
centuries. There are now thousands of patents with claims to isolated DNA, and 
some unknown (but certainly large) number of patents to purified natural 
products or fragments thereof. . . .  I believe we must be particularly wary of 
expanding the judicial exception to patentable subject matter where both settled 
expectations and extensive property rights are involved.65
The Supreme Court would eventually disagree with this portion of Judge 
Moore’s opinion, holding in A ss’n fo r  Molecular Pathology v. M yriad  Genetics, Inc. 
that isolated DNA is not patentable.66 But Judge Moore’s concerns were 
legitimate, and she was exactly right to factor them into her decision. In a 
vacuum, Judge Moore might well have believed that isolated DNA should not 
be patentable, but she was not operating in a vacuum.67
For every case such as M yriad, in which the Supreme Court was willing to 
forge ahead with legal change despite the potential harm to reliance interests, 
there are others in which the final court to consider the issue stayed its hand 
and adhered to precedent. One example is Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu K inzoku  Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., which concerned prosecution history estoppel.68 In an earlier 
case addressing the same issue, W arner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 
the Supreme Court had noted the importance of maintaining consistent 
doctrinal standards over time on an issue that was central to many parties
64. See A ss’n  fo r  Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part).
65. Id. (footnote omitted).
66. See 569 U.S. at 580 (holding that isolated DNA is unpatentable but cDNA is patentable).
67. M yriad  represents an especially damaging type of retroactive legal change. Isolated 
genomic DNA patent claims prior to M yriad  had value, but much of that value could 
be equally captured by claims to cDNA arising from the same inventive work. 
See Jessica L.A. Marks et al., Gene Patents W o n ’t Disappear Post-Myriad, FINNEGAN 
(July 22, 2013), https://perma.cc/4SEL-X5WB. The Supreme Court in M yriad  held that 
cDNA claims were patentable. See 569 U.S. at 580. Imagine a patent-owning firm with 
claims to isolated genomic DNA that could have, but did not, include a claim for a 
cDNA sequence. That patentholder would have been dramatically affected by M yriad  
all because of an accident of claim drafting. It might have relied on the PTO and Federal 
Circuit’s view that isolated DNA was patentable. But once the Supreme Court decided 
otherwise, the patentee’s opportunity for claiming the cDNA invention would have 
passed, leaving the firm with no recourse. Cf. David L. Schwartz, Retroactivity at the 
Federal Circuit, 89 IND. L.J. 1547, 1553-55 (2014) (explaining the retroactive effects of 
patent decisions).
68. See 535 U.S. 722,726 (2002).
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within the patent system.69 In Festo, which followed five years later, the Court 
doubled down on this idea. It admonished the Federal Circuit for “ignor[ing] 
the guidance of W arner-Jenkinson, which instructed that courts must be 
cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the 
inventing community.”70
In the years since, the Federal Circuit has cited Festo’s argument for 
maintaining the legal status quo in a legion of cases. One notable example is 
A riad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a case that concerned the written 
description requirement.71 Wrote the en banc court:
In addition to the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent supporting 
the existence of a written description requirement separate from enablement, 
stare decisis impels us to uphold it now... .  [T]o change course now would disrupt 
the settled expectations of the inventing community, which has relied on it in 
drafting and prosecuting patents, concluding licensing agreements, and rendering 
validity and infringement opinions. As the Supreme Court stated in admonishing 
this court, we “must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled 
expectations of the inventing community.”77
The en banc Federal Circuit took a similar tack in Lighting Ballast 
Control LLC v. Philips Electronics North America C orp .P  a case concerning the 
(relatively narrow) question of the standard of review for claim construction.74
69. See 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997) (“[T]he lengthy history of the doctrine of equivalents strongly 
supports adherence to our refusal . . .  to find that the Patent Act conflicts with that 
doctrine.”).
70. 535 U.S. at 739 (citing W arner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 28).
71. See 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The written description requirement 
demands that an inventor demonstrate in the patent application that she is “in 
possession” of the invention—in the sense of having invented it and having recognized 
inventing it at the time of invention—before she can receive a patent. See id. at 1355. 
The necessary disclosure is that which a person of ordinary skill in the art would 
recognize as sufficient to convey possession of the invention, and not a subjective 
inquiry into what the inventor did or did not know. See id. at 1351.
72. Id. at 1347 (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. at 739).
73. 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). The Supreme Court later vacated the Federal 
Circuit’s decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015). See Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. 
Universal Lighting Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.).
74. See Lighting Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1281. Claim construction is the procedure in 
which a court interprets a patent claim and defines its legal meaning, similar to how a 
court might interpret a statute. See generally Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
517 U.S. 370 (1996) (describing the process and legal rules governing claim construc­
tion).
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The court again quoted Festo to explain its unwillingness to change the existing 
standard:
Stare decisis embraces procedural as well as substantive precedent. Procedures in 
the litigation-prone arena of patent rights can affect the cost, time, and 
uncertainty of litigation, and in turn affect economic activity founded on the 
presence or absence of enforceable patents. Courts should be “cautious before 
adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing 
community.
Yet another example comes from Immersion Corp. v. H T C  Corp., a case that 
concerned the extent to which a patent application filed as a continuation of an 
earlier application could claim the filing date of the earlier application.76 The 
Federal Circuit held that a continuation application may claim the filing date 
of a parent application if the continuation is filed on the same day the parent 
application issues, as had been the PTO’s practice for “half a century.”77 Again, 
the court cited concern for reliance interests as a reason for preserving a 
longstanding standard. It explained that “the repeated, consistent . . . judicial 
and agency interpretations, in this area of evident public reliance, provide a 
powerful reason to read [the statute] to preserve, not upset, the established 
position.”78 As the court noted, “[i]nvestment-backed expectations and reliance 
interests in patent law are often strong.”79 These are merely a few prominent 
examples of patent cases in which courts’ concern for reliance interests played 
some role in decisions to preserve the legal status quo. Other such cases 
abound.80
75. Lighting Ballast Control, 744 F.3d at 1283 (citation omitted) (quoting Festo, 535 U.S. 
at 739).
76. See 826 F.3d 1357,1359,1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
77. See id. at 1362-65.
78. Id. at 1365.
79. Id. at 1364 (citing Festo, 535 U.S. at 739).
80. See, e.g., STC.UNM v. Intel Corp., 767 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Dyk, J., 
concurring in the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc) (“The rule against 
involuntary joinder is well established. Changing that rule would upset settled 
expectations.”); Hyatt v. Doll, 576 F.3d 1246, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (referencing reliance 
interests and stare decisis as reasons for the outcome the court reached), vacated 
on gran t o f  reh’g en banc sub nom. Hyatt v. Kappos, 366 F. App’x 170 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Masco Corp. v. United States, 303 F.3d 1316,1327 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (declining to apply a 
statutory provision in a way that would “disrupt patentees’ settled expectations 
regarding the scope of their claims”). B ut see, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. 
First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 968-71 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that stare decisis compelled interpreting the Patent Act to include a laches 
defense); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976-77 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that stare decisis and concern for reliance interests should have compelled the 
court to uphold the validity of business method patents), a ffd  sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 
561 U.S. 593(2010).
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Of course, this is not proof that concerns for investment-backed expecta­
tions were dispositive in these cases. Courts frequently pay lip service to 
various arguments when they would have reached the same outcome 
regardless.81 However, it seems quite likely that in at least some of these cases, 
the courts reached outcomes because of stare decisis and the fear of upsetting 
reliance interests that they would not have reached had the case been one of 
first impression. Judge Moore’s concurring opinion in Ass’n fo r  Molecular 
Pathology is the most notable such example, because she wrote separately 
specifically to make the point about reliance interests and because she noted 
explicitly that her vote might have been different had she been writing on a 
blank slate.82 But she is almost surely not the only judge to have reasoned along 
these lines.
It is not necessarily good or bad (from the perspective of social welfare) for 
judges to refrain from changing the law out of concern for reliance interests. 
As noted in Part I above, reliance interests in patent law are valid concerns, and 
courts should be wary of upsetting them to such a degree that patent-based 
investment in R&D begins to diminish. At the same time, there is an 
unavoidable tradeoff: If courts are not making necessary changes to the law, 
then the positive value of updating the law is lost. The result can be legal 
stultification. This is particularly salient in the context of patent law, where 
changes in technology and markets can render legal rules outdated at a faster 
rate than in other legal contexts.83
The primary concern is that courts will err in the direction of the status 
quo, failing to change the law in some circumstances when the benefits of 
doing so would outweigh the costs. A related concern is that the PTO’s zeal in
81. See, e.g., Daniel M. Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COLUM. L. Rev. 951, 
952 (1951) (“The distinction between policy and personnel, however, is an artificial one, 
and the very courts that pay lip service to the doctrine recognize its dubious validity.” 
(footnote omitted)); William H. Simon, Transparency Is the Solution, Not the Problem: 
A Reply to Bruce Green, 60 Stan . L. R ev. 1673,1685 (2008) (responding to Bruce A. Green, 
The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in Professional 
Regulation, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1605 (2008)) f‘[T]he court system pays lip service to values 
of public access, but it compromises these values. . . . ”); Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond 
Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2608 (2006) 
(“Though the Supreme Court has not invoked the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate 
a federal statute since 1935, the Court continues to pay lip service to the doctrine and to 
hold it in reserve for extreme cases.” (footnote omitted)).
82. See 689 F.3d 1303,1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), affd in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 
(2013).
83. See Rafael X. Zahralddin, Note, The Effect of Broad Patent Scope on the Competitiveness of 
United States Industry, 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 949, 995 (1992) (explaining that rapid develop­
ment in technology is not taken into account in patent law, to the detriment of 
innovation).
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granting patents of a certain type could itself become the reason that those 
types of inventions are deemed patentable, if thousands of patents have already 
issued. Thus, an excessive focus on reliance interests could have the effect of 
placing too much power in the hands of the PTO.84 Importantly, reluctance to 
alter the law out of fear of upsetting reliance interests is a self-reinforcing 
phenomenon—a positive-feedback cycle. A willingness on the part of the PTO 
to grant patents, and a willingness on the part of the courts to uphold them, 
will beget more such patents. Those patents will in turn beget even stronger 
reliance interests. If courts do not change the law as quickly as would be 
optimal for fear of harming established interests, the law can persist in a 
suboptimal state indefinitely. And reliance interests will not necessarily fade 
over time. To the contrary—in many cases, the longer reliance interests persist, 
the more entrenched they become, and the more that private parties learn to 
rely on them.
Consider Myriad, for example. If the Supreme Court had allowed the 
patents on isolated DNA to stand,85 firms would have continued to file for 
those patents, and the PTO would have continued to grant them. The number 
of such patents would have continued to grow, as would the extent to which 
businesses relied upon those patents. The reliance interests would have been no 
weaker ten years later than they were when M yriad was decided. This pattern 
would reverse only if some exogenous shock caused the industry as a whole to 
fade or the importance of patents within the industry to diminish. Such a shock 
is of course possible, but it is not something that courts—or anyone else—can 
predict.
To summarize, the costs of upsetting reliance-based interests are real, and 
courts are right to take those costs into account. In some cases, these concerns 
will lead courts to refrain from changing the law, even when they believe that 
the law is not optimally calibrated. In many cases, courts are likely privileging 
the status quo to a greater extent than they should, leading to harmful legal 
ossification. But even when courts are deciding cases optimally, they cannot 
escape the costs of either (1) changing the law and thereby damaging 
investment-based expectations, or (2) preserving the status quo and thereby
84. Cf. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1344-45 (Moore, J., concurring in part) 
(explaining that the fact that the PTO has granted numerous patents over a substantial 
period of time provides an argument against changing the law); Masur, Regulating 
Patents, supra note 17, at 278-79 (describing the balance of power between the PTO and 
the Federal Circuit and discussing which institution should be the prime mover in 
patent law).
85. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
982
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity 
71 Stan.L. Rev. 963 (2019)
forgoing the benefits of legal change. What is needed is some mechanism for 
protecting existing reliance interests while simultaneously allowing the courts 
to make productive updates to patent law. The following Part considers one 
possible mechanism.
III. Takings and Patent Retroactivity
Evolution in patent law, whether incremental or momentous, imposes 
costs on the private parties that rely upon the law. At the outset, those costs are 
privately borne, but they can metastasize into significant social harm if they 
induce private parties to reduce their R&D, or to eschew patents and rely 
instead on trade secret protection. Even worse, courts that attempt to take 
these costs into account will sometimes end up stultifying the law, to the 
detriment of the entire patent system. The goal of policymakers within the 
patent system should be to find a means of permitting updates to the law while 
simultaneously protecting existing reliance interests to the degree necessary to 
encourage continued investment.
This is the set of problems that takings law is meant to address. The Fifth 
Amendment provides that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”86 If the government seizes private property 
without providing just compensation, the government seizure is considered 
null and void.87 Takings law functions (in part) to protect reliance interests by 
ensuring that the property on which those interests are based is not seized or 
destroyed without the owner being compensated for her loss.88 In that sense, it 
is a type of government-provided insurance. At the same time, takings law does 
not prevent legal change, even change that would destroy property. The law 
can always be adjusted, even in ways that would confiscate or destroy property, 
so long as just compensation is paid. Accordingly, it is worth considering 
takings law as a solution to the problem of legal instability in patent law. 
When a court changes patent law to the detriment of some preexisting 
interests, should the legal change be considered a judicial taking of the parties’ 
patent rights? This Part takes up that question, first from a normative and then 
from a descriptive perspective.
86. U.S. Const, amend. V.
87. See, e.g., Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,124-25 (1974).
88. See Joseph W illiam  Singer, The Reliance Interest in  Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev 611 737-39 
(1988).
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A. The Normative Case for and Against Applying Takings Law to 
Patents
At first glance, takings law would seem to be a fitting solution to the 
problem of legal instability in the patent context. In critical respects, the 
principles that underlie takings law mirror the concerns that arise when 
patent law is changed. First, takings law creates stable expectations for 
individuals and firms in order to induce them to invest in improving their 
property.89 Recall the prior example of a firm that owns a plot of land and is 
considering building a factory.90 If the government could seize the land 
without compensation, the firm would be reluctant to construct the factory, 
fearing that it will pay for the investment and then reap none of the rewards.91 
Takings law thus acts as a type of social insurance against legal changes that 
might upset reliance interests.92
These concerns apply equally to patent law. The R&D necessary to 
generate patentable inventions can be costly, and in many cases firms are 
unlikely to undertake that R&D without the promise of enforceable patents.93 
When the government invalidates existing patents through legal change, firms 
take note, and estimate a lower likelihood that they will be able to enforce their 
patents and use them to earn profits in the future.94 The likely result is that 
firms will reduce investment in R&D, solely due to diminished confidence in 
their ability to rely on the patent rights they obtain.
89. See R ichard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law  § 3.1, at 40-41 (8th ed. 2011); 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A  Theory o f  Property, 90 CORNELL L. Rev. 531, 
606-07 (2005); Davidson, supra note 52, at 453.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
91. See POSNER, supra note 89, § 3.1, at 40-41 (explaining that property rights are necessary 
for investment).
92. See Singer, supra note 88, at 737-39.
93. There are of course means other than patents for funding or inducing innovation, see 
Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 307, but there is no question that patents account 
for a significant proportion of all innovation.
94. Evidence that this is taking place can be found in the reactions by firms to major patent 
decisions. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42815, Mayo  V. 
Prometheus Implications for Patents, Biotechnology, and Personalized 
M edicine 9 (2012) (noting the harm to medical diagnostic firms from the M ayo  
decision); Alexa Johnson, Note, A  Crisis o f  Patent Law and Medical Innovation  
The Category o f  Diagnostic Claims in the W ake  o f  Ariosa v. Sequenom, 27 Health 
Matrix 435, 437-38 (2017); Charlotte Edwards, N u-M ed Optim istic About N itric  Oxide 
Prospects A fter  Patent Ruling, Verdict M ed. Devices (Aug. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc 
/X57Y-QKXQ.
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A similar analysis applies even after patents are granted. Patents are 
analogous to undeveloped real property.95 The patent is only as valuable as its 
owner makes it; she must transform the invention embodied in the patent into 
a product or service with real market value. Yet this process is often expensive, 
particularly for certain types of inventions (such as pharmaceuticals), and in 
some cases firms will be reluctant to undertake the necessary investments 
without the assurance of substantial profits, which patents are supposed to 
provide.96 Unforeseen changes in the law can thus diminish firms’ willingness 
to invest in commercializing their patented inventions, just as the prospect of 
uncompensated takings could make owners of real property reluctant to 
construct factories or make other improvements.97
Second, takings law forces the government to internalize the costs of its 
projects and distribute those costs among a larger number of taxpayers.9® 
Suppose the government were considering constructing a public park on land 
currently occupied by four private homes. Ideally, the government would 
balance the benefits of the park against the costs of the lost homes and only 
pursue the project if its benefits exceeded its costs. But if the government could 
simply seize the property, it could externalize the costs onto the four 
homeowners who would lose their houses.99
Requiring the government to compensate these homeowners for the 
taking of their houses changes the equation. The government must pay that 
compensation out of tax revenues, meaning that many of the same people who 
benefit from the park will also bear its costs.100 If the park’s beneficiaries will 
bear its costs as well, they are more likely to favor the project only when its 
benefits exceed its costs, and more likely to force the government to act 
accordingly.101
Here, the analogy to patent law is not as exact. To be sure, Congress or an 
executive branch agency might “take” a patent by infringing it, thus
95. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
Minn. L. Rev. 697,710 (2001) (explaining that without patents, many inventions might 
remain undeveloped).
96. See id.
97. See Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory 
Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 677, 714-16 (2005) (suggesting that property owners should 
be partially but not entirely compensated for takings).
98. See id. at 705-06, 727-28; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation 
for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 110, 131-33 (2002) (suggesting that the goal of 
encouraging the government to internalize the cost of its projects might support a 
system of incomplete compensation for takings).
99. See Serkin, supra note 97, at 705-06.
100. See id. at 724-28 (describing how takings force costs to be shared across a tax base).
101. See id. at 704-05 (describing the benefits of cost internalization).
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externalizing the costs of a government project onto a single actor.102 But those 
sorts of actions are not the subject of interest here; judicially driven legal 
change is. Courts do not quite pursue “projects” in the same sense as a 
legislature or executive might, and courts do not control taxes or spending. 
Nor are courts politically accountable in the sense that they must weigh costs 
and benefits and suffer the consequences if they do not strike the balance 
appropriately.103 At the same time, we do want judges who decide patent cases 
to attempt (so far as they can) to account for the costs and benefits of their 
decisions. Judges should not be making law while looking only at the benefits 
of a decision and ignoring its costs.104 Similarly, while judges would not be 
responsible for paying compensation in the event of a taking, there is evidence 
that judges are responsive to views within elite legal circles regarding the 
optimal development of the law.105 There is reason to believe that judges will 
render decisions in such a fashion as to maximize their standing within these 
circles.106 Having to pay compensation for invalidated patents might change 
this calculus among patent stakeholders, and thus among patent judges.107
At the same time, there are very strong considerations counseling against 
applying takings law to patents or any other system of legal change. The most 
significant is the cost of legal change. A new legal rule that invalidates 
thousands of existing patents could lead to claims against the government for 
billions of dollars or more.108 Adjudicating the claims would also be incredibly
102. This frequently occurs in the context of Department of Defense contracts with private 
defense firms. See generally Timothy R. Wyatt, In Search of Reasonable Compensation. 
Patent Infringement by Defense Contractors with the Authorization and Consent of the U.S. 
Government, 20 FED. ClR. B.J. 79 (2010).
103. Executive agencies are required to conduct cost-benefit analyses, see Exec. Order 
No. 12,866, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638-40 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 
94,95 (2017), but no such limit is placed on the courts.
104. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the judicial 
Role, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (2018) (describing the role that judges should play in 
evaluating cost-benefit analyses).
105. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’Friends Can Teach 
Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. Rev. 395 (2011) (describing the influence of 
amicus briefs on patent courts).
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, What Do judges and justices Maximize?: (The Same Thing 
Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. Ct. ECON. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1993) (suggesting that judges derive 
utility from their popularity with members of the bar).
107. An aggrieved patent owner who believes that her patent has been taken might be able 
to file a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 seeking compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) 
(2017); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Bradley M. Taub, 
Comment, Why Bother Calling Patents Property?: The Government’s Path to License Any 
Patent and Maybe Pay for It, 6 J. MARSHALL R e v . In t e l l . PROP. L. 151, 157-58 (2006) 
(discussing the limited application of § 1491 to patents).
108. See Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE L.J. 1701,1725-26 (2016) (offering back- 
of-the-envelope estimates of the values of various patents). This would be only a fiscal
footnote continued on next page
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difficult and costly—the market value of a patent is usually far from clear, and 
it is typically much harder to discern than the market value of real property.109 
In other contexts, forcing the government to pay for its actions might be 
beneficial. Here, however, the administrative expense involved, as well as the 
fact that it would be courts that create the need for payment, would likely rob 
the arrangement of any value. Recall that the general rationale for requiring 
that takings be compensated is to force the government to internalize the costs 
of its actions.110 If it is the court that is taking an action, but the legislature that 
must then raise the necessary revenue to pay for it, this effort at cost 
internalization will fail. More likely, courts would become reluctant to enact 
legal change for fear of being blamed when they stick the federal government 
with an enormous bill.
In addition, takings law is a poor fit because it offers only an asymmetric 
solution to a symmetric problem. Recall that the problem of uncertainty in 
patent law affects both owners and nonowners of patents.* 111 Just as some firms 
rely on the continued existence of patents to justify and fund their R&D 
operations, other firms rely on the continued nonexistence of certain types of 
patents to offer them freedom to operate without fear of being sued.112 The 
problems caused by legal instability apply symmetrically, affecting legal 
changes that increase or decrease the power of patents. Legal change that 
strengthens patents or expands their reach can harm these existing reliance 
interests just as much as legal change that weakens or invalidates patents can
cost, rather than a net social cost. Invalidating scores of patents would provide an 
immediate benefit to consumer welfare by eliminating the “shadow tax” those patents 
impose on consumer products. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 25, at 312. The overall 
social benefits might outweigh the costs. Nevertheless, in practical terms, the federal 
government would be reluctant to pay its share of the costs out of the federal fisc each 
time valuable patents were invalidated, and the courts would likely be reluctant to run 
up the federal tab in this fashion.
109. See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and M isuse o f  Patent Licenses, 110 Nw. U. L. Rev. 115, 
122-25 (2015) (describing the difficulties courts face in valuing patents).
110. SeeSerkin, supra note 97, at 714-16.
111. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
112. See generally M. Henry Heines, The Two Faces o f  Patent Due Diligence: A  Case Study in Solar 
Cells and Nanotechnology, 6 Nanotechnology L. & Bus. 4 (2009) (describing the 
importance of establishing freedom to operate by ascertaining that a new product will 
not give rise to a patent infringement suit).
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harm reliance interests founded on those patents. For example, broadening the 
scope of patent claims can frustrate past efforts at designing products to avoid 
infringement.113
Takings law, by contrast, works asymmetrically. It is possible to imagine a 
judicial decision invalidating a patent being treated as a judicial taking114 and— 
if the taking is not compensated—the decision being declared unconstitutional 
and void.115 But it is essentially impossible to imagine a judicial decision 
expanding patent rights being treated as a taking. As an analytic matter, the 
absence of property rights—or freedom to operate—has never been classified as 
“property,” and it is hard to imagine a court stretching the definition so far as 
to accommodate it.116 And as a practical matter, it would be nearly impossible 
to determine which parties were affected by the decision and therefore 
deserved compensation. If takings law were applied to changes in patent law, it 
would apply only to the loss of patent rights.
This would skew outcomes in the courts. Courts might be more willing to 
make changes that invalidated existing patents if they knew the owners of 
those patents would be compensated for the loss of their intellectual property 
rights. Courts might also be more willing to make changes that expanded 
intellectual property rights if it were costless to do so. But either way, the fact 
that only one side would receive compensation would affect courts’ 
decisionmaking.117 For this reason, as well as the others described above, it 
would be normatively undesirable if courts began to treat changes in 
substantive patent law as takings for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.
So much for the normative case—what is the state of the law? Are judicial 
changes that lead to patent invalidations potentially judicial takings? The next 
two Subparts consider that question.
113. Firms expend resources in securing freedom to operate before making substantial 
investment in development projects. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, 
Nonenforcement, NonproblemRethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 
HOUS. L. R e v . 1059, 1077 (2008) (citing John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool 
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY 285,292-94 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 135-38.
115. See supra text accompanying note 87.
116. That is to say, it has never been classified as property in a legal sense, or for purposes of 
the takings clause. Various scholars have described the public domain as a type of 
property available to everyone. See generally James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement 
and the Construction of the Public Domain, L a w  & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter-Spring 2003, 
at 33 (using the language of property to describe the public domain as common 
property available to all).
117. Cf. John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 Geo. W ash. L. Rev. 522, 542-43 
(2007) (describing the effects of asymmetric incentives on judicial decisionmaking).
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B. Are Patents Property for Purposes of the Takings Clause?
The Supreme Court has held that because “[pjatents . . . have long been 
considered a species of property . . . , they are surely included within the 
‘property’ of which no person may be deprived by a State without due process 
of law.”118
However, property rights entitled to protection under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment are not necessarily entitled to protection under 
the Takings Clause.119 This is particularly true of property rights that fall 
within the category of federally created benefits.120 In Bowen v. Gilliard, the 
Supreme Court held that a reduction in benefits from a government program 
could be subjected to due process scrutiny but could not constitute a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.121 The analogy between the benefits at issue in 
Bowen and patents is of course imperfect. But the holding in Bowen demon­
strates generally that the description of patents as property in other contexts is 
not dispositive to the question of patents’ status as property under the Takings 
Clause.
Instead of the Takings Clause, much of the action regarding patents relates 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1498. That statute provides:
W henever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United States 
is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the owner 
thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall 
be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal Claims 
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and 
manufacture.122
Patentees thus generally do not bother with claims under the Takings Clause 
when the government infringes a patent, because such claims can usually be 
resolved under § 1498.123
118. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,642 (1999) 
(quoting U.S. CONST, amend. V); see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. W right, 94 U.S. 92, 96 
(1877) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. The right 
rests on the same foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same sanctions.”).
119. See U.S. CONST, amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”).
120. See Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern Courts Resist Applying 
the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right to Do So, 15 Geo. M ason L. R ev. 1, 
36-41 (2007).
121. See 483 U.S. 587,602-06 (1987).
122. 28 U.S.C.§ 1498(a) (2017).
123. See Flannah Brennan et al., A Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging 
Government Patent Use for Health, 18 Yale J.L. & T ech. 275,308-13 (2016).
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Courts have described § 1498 as providing a cause of action to obtain 
“compensation for the Government’s unauthorized taking and use” under the 
doctrine of eminent domain.124 Both the Federal Circuit and Court of Claims 
have occasionally gone further by referring explicitly to the Fifth Amendment 
when discussing § 1498 claims.125
In Zoltek Corp. v. United States, however, the Federal Circuit rejected this 
framing.126 There, the patentee alleged that a government contractor had 
infringed on its carbon fiber methods patent when building fighter jets, and 
that the federal government was therefore liable under § 1498.127 The trial 
court had found that § 1498(c)—which bars any “claim arising in a foreign 
country”—prevented Zoltek from making a claim under § 1498(a) because the 
contractor manufactured the carbon fiber in Japan.128 However, the court 
allowed Zoltek to amend its complaint to allege a Fifth Amendment taking.129 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling with respect to the § 1498 
claim but “reverse[d] the trial court’s ruling that Zoltek [could] allege patent 
infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking.”130 The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari,131 and though the Federal Circuit later reheard the case en banc and 
reversed on other grounds,132 it left the relevant portion of its original Zoltek 
opinion intact.
The contradiction between the Federal Circuit’s initial holding in Zoltek 
and its previous descriptions of § 1498 is striking, but explainable. In previous 
cases, statements about eminent domain or the Fifth Amendment had no effect
124. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also 
Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1114 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(describing the statute in similar terms); Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070,1082 
(Ct. Cl. 1976) (per curiam) (same).
125. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“The government’s unlicensed use of a patented invention is properly viewed as a 
taking of property under the Fifth Amendment through the government’s exercise 
of its power of eminent domain and the patent holder’s remedy for such use is 
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).”), vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997); 
Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (en banc) (“W hen the 
government has infringed, it is deemed to have ‘taken’ the patent license under an 
eminent domain theory, and compensation is the just compensation required by the 
fifth amendment.”).
126. See 442 F.3d 1345, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam), vacated en banc, 672 F.3d 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
127. See id. at 1349.
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) (2017); Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 688,689-90 (2003).
129. See Zoltek, 58 Fed. Cl. at 707.
130. See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353.
131. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S. 1113 (2007) (mem.).
132. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309,1314-22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc).
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whatsoever on the success or failure of the claims: The § 1498 remedy would be 
available regardless.133 Zoltek was important because the resolution of the 
takings question was central to the holding.134 When it really mattered, the 
Federal Circuit rejected the Takings Clause interpretation of § 1498, and both 
the Federal Circuit sitting en banc and the Supreme Court chose not to reverse 
that holding.
The Supreme Court recently suggested in dicta that patents might be 
property for purposes of the Takings Clause. In Horne v. Department o f  
Agriculture, the Court held that a U.S. Department of Agriculture order 
requiring raisin producers to “physically set aside [raisins]... for the account of 
the Government” without compensation constituted a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment.135 As the Court noted, “[n]othing in the text or history of the 
Takings Clause, or our precedents, suggests that the rule is any different when 
it comes to the appropriation of personal property.”136 The Court supported 
this principle with a quotation from James v. Campbell, a century-old case 
addressing patent infringement: “[A patent] confers upon the patentee an 
exclusive property in the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or 
used by the government itself, without just compensation, any more than it 
can appropriate or use without compensation land which has been patented to 
a private purchaser.”137
Some scholars have argued that this choice of words “left no doubt... that 
patents are subject to the Takings Clause.”138 Taken at face value, this assertion 
seems reasonable: In an opinion holding that personal property is subject to the 
Takings Clause, the Court cited a patent case as providing historical support 
for that proposition. The implication is that the Court was agreeing with the 
language from James. Applied in a relevant case, this would likely bring patents 
under the protection of the Takings Clause.
Nonetheless, the quotation in Horne looks a lot like the past descriptions of 
§ 1498 articulated by the Federal Circuit and Court of Claims: Patent 
infringement is described in terms of eminent domain or takings when that
133. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 
vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997).
134. This is because compensation under § 1498 was unavailable due to the fact that the 
infringing product had been manufactured in Japan. See Zoltek, 58 Fed. Cl. at 707; see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) (2017) (“The provisions of this section shall not apply to any claim 
arising in a foreign country.”).
135. See 135 S. Ct. 2419,2424-25,2431 (2015).
136. Id. at 2426.
137. Id. at 2427 (alteration in original) (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356,358 (1882)).
138. Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 W ash . & Lee L. Re v . 719,775 (2016); 
see also, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Supreme Court Recognizes That Patents Are Property, Ct r . for  
PROTECTION In tel l . Pro p . (June 22,2015), https://perma.cc/FL3K-QF9G.
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characterization is irrelevant to the resolution of the case at hand.139 The 
Supreme Court might choose to pursue this line of reasoning when it is 
necessary for a holding, but it would be premature to assume that the Court 
will do so.
Courts have also occasionally considered the status of patents in the 
context of the regulatory takings doctrine. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
the Supreme Court held that government regulation of property can be so 
restrictive as to be a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment.140 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court 
identified three key factors relevant to the question whether there has been a 
regulatory taking: (l) “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental 
action,” including an analysis of whether the taking was a “physical invasion by 
the government.”141
In in its 1985 decision in Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, the Federal Circuit 
applied the Penn Central regulatory takings test to the retroactive application of 
a patent reexamination procedure used by the PTO.142 The patentee argued 
that a federal statute retroactively subjecting his patent to reexamination 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.143 The Patlex court 
eventually upheld the constitutionality of the statute.144 But in the course of 
doing so, the court declared that patents “fall squarely within both classical and 
judicial definitions of protectible property.”145 The court described its decision 
in terms of due process, but the Penn Central test is an analysis of takings, and 
thus this case is best understood as the application of takings law to a patent.
It is not clear, however, that Patlexs approach to the subject has stood the 
test of time. This is the only case in which the Federal Circuit has applied the 
Penn Central test in a patent case.146 No court has since regarded a patent as 
property entitled to regulatory takings protection and applied the Penn Central 
test. The handful of regulatory patent taking claims since Patlex have all failed,
139. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 
vacated and remanded mem., 520 U.S. 1183 (1997).
140. See 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
141. 438U.S. 104,124(1978).
142. See 758 F.2d 594,597-99,602-03 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
143. See id. at 598-99.
144. See id. at 603.
145. Id. at 599.
146. See id. at 602-03.
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some rather spectacularly.147 Two of these cases involved patentees whose 
patents expired because they failed to pay maintenance fees. 148 That is, they 
involved patentees who had no property interests whatsoever. A third was 
very much like Patlex.149 From any perspective, then, the law is still far from 
recognizing patents as property subject to the protection of the Takings 
Clause.
C. Judicial Takings and Patent Law
Any analysis of whether changes in settled patent law might amount to 
takings must confront a second complication: These would be judicial takings, 
not the typical sort of takings created by executive or legislative action.150 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, a plurality of the Supreme Court announced that courts could 
themselves effect takings.151 That is, if a court declared that a previously 
established property right no longer existed, that would constitute a taking for 
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.152 The issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment 
was a question of state law regarding beachfront land rights, 153 and the 
decision did not clearly indicate whether its holding could also apply to 
infringements of property rights under federal law. A portion of Justice Scalia’s 
opinion joined only by a plurality of the Court stated that “the Takings Clause 
bars the State from taking private property without paying for it, no matter 
which branch is the instrument of the taking.”154 It is not clear whether his 
reference to “the State” was to only the fifty state governments or to the 
government generically (in all of its forms). Nevertheless, at a minimum, the
147. See, eg., Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 228-29 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Korsinsky v. 
Godici, No. 05 Civ. 2791(DLC), 2005 WL 2312886, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2005), affd 
per curiam sub nom. Korsinsky v. Dudas, 227 F. App’x 891 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Michels v. 
United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 426, 429-31 (2006); Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 488 
(2003), affd, 466 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
148. See Korsinsky, 2005 WL 2312886, at *5-6; Michels, 72 Fed. Cl. at 429-31.
149. See Joy Techs., 959 F.2d at 228-29 (holding that patent reexamination does not constitute 
an unlawful taking or deprive the patent owner of his right to a jury trial).
150. For the leading article on judicial takings, see Barton FI. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 
76 Va.L. Rev. 1449(1990).
151. See 560 U.S. 702,715 (2010) (plurality opinion).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 707-09 (majority opinion).
154. Id. at 715 (plurality opinion).
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opinion raises the implication that a federal decision altering patent rights 
could similarly constitute a taking (if patents are property subject to takings 
under the Fifth Amendment, of course).155
However, since Stop the Beach Renourishment, no court has held that a 
judicial decision effected a taking.156 Courts have described most judicial 
takings claims as flawed, either because they clearly failed the tests put forward 
in Stop the Beach Renourishment or because they constituted improper collateral 
attacks before courts lacking jurisdiction.157 For that matter, while some courts 
have accepted the framework developed in the Stop the Beach Renourishment 
plurality opinion,158 others have appeared skeptical that judicial takings are 
indeed takings at all.159 Nonetheless, no court has held it impossible for a 
federal court to effect a taking,160 and the Court of Federal Claims has 
suggested it may have jurisdiction over a properly framed judicial takings 
case.161
All of this is to say that a judicial takings claim based upon a change in the 
law is highly speculative as a legal matter. This is probably for the good, given 
the hurdles that applying takings law would impose on courts’ ability to
155. Cf. J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 
1747 (2005) (proposing a theory for how judicial takings doctrine might apply to patent 
law).
156. See Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(noting that the plaintiff “had been unable to cite to any ‘case in which a property 
owner prevailed on a judicial takings claim’” (quoting Shinnecock Indian Nation v. 
United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 369, 386 (2013), a ffd  in part, vacated in  part, and remanded, 782 
F.3d 1345)).
157. See, e.g., Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 367,380-81 (2016), a ffd , 862 F.3d 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert, denied, 138 S. Ct. 1989 (2018); Shinnecock Indian Nation, 112 Fed. 
Cl. at 383 n.6.
158. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 709 F.3d 1114, 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Inv’rs Sav. Bank v. 
Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 38 A.3d 638,643-44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).
159. See, e.g., Shinnecock Indian Nation, 112 Fed. Cl. at 385.
160. There is also a separate question whether a change in federal law could constitute a 
judicial taking. Some courts take the position that a judicial decision interpreting a 
federal law merely indicates what that law has “always” meant. See, e.g., Rivers v. 
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 313 n.12 (1994). Under this view, a patent 
declared invalid under a new judicial decision was “always” invalid, and thus never 
constituted property protected by the Takings Clause. It remains to be seen whether 
this view of judicial action will prevail in judicial takings cases, in the event that the 
doctrine of judicial takings evolves.
161. See Petro-Hunt, 126 Fed. Cl. at 382-83; cf. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 
1339, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction 
over takings claims that “do[] not require the trial court to review the district court’s 
actions”).
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improve and update the law. But the possibility nonetheless exists, and it 
would not be surprising to see takings claims, perhaps unsuccessful ones, 
brought by aggrieved patent owners in the near future.162
*  *  *
The fact that judicial takings doctrine does not currently apply to patent 
law is, then, a positive for the patent system, and one that courts should 
maintain. By imposing high costs on legal change, takings law would 
unnecessarily stultify the development of patent law. Takings law is also an 
asymmetric response to a symmetric problem. It would protect patentholders 
but not parties who relied on the freedom to operate in a technological field 
where patents were not permitted. Nevertheless, the original problem that 
motivated the inquiry into takings remains. Without any means of 
compensating parties whose reliance interests are upset when the law is 
changed, courts will sometimes harm investment-based expectations to such 
an extent as to reduce R&D incentives going forward. In other cases, they may 
refuse to alter the law even when it would be wise to do so. What is needed is 
some means of slicing this Gordian knot—a mechanism that would free courts 
to make necessary legal changes without fear of unduly harming existing 
reliance interests. The next Part discusses a more promising candidate.
IV. Purely Prospective Changes to Patent Law
At its heart, the problem facing the patent system is generated by the fact 
that legal change is both forward looking and backward looking. Change to 
patent law affects future patents, which is beneficial—assuming that the legal 
changes are improvements on the status quo. But change to patent law also 
affects existing patents, which can be either beneficial—to the extent that it 
eliminates harmful patents that impede innovation—or harmful—to the extent 
that it affects reliance interests, destabilizes the law, and thereby diminishes 
future investment incentives. Recall as well that the costs of legal change will 
exist even if the legal change itself is a beneficial one.163 When judges fear that 
their decisions might diminish future investment in R&D, they can become 
understandably reluctant to amend the law.164 The consequences are 
deleterious in either direction: either the courts change the law, to the 
detriment of some existing reliance interests, or they refuse to change the law, 
to the ongoing detriment of the patent system as a whole.
162. One such claim appears to be percolating, though it pertains to inter partes review 
procedures, not changes in the law made by the federal courts. See Peter Leung, 
Government Aims to Kill Fresh Attack on Patent Challenges, BLOOMBERG L., (Oct. 5, 2018, 
3:05 PM), https://perma.cc/XVQ5-RQEQ.
163. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part II.
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The solution is to decouple the effects on future patents from the effects on 
existing patents—to allow courts to make positive changes affecting patents 
that will be granted in the future without similarly affecting patents that 
already exist. That is, federal courts should be given the power to make legal 
decisions that are purely prospective. They should have the ability to issue 
decisions that only affect patents that are granted after the decision, but do not 
affect patents that existed when the case was decided.
The issue of when legal change should be made retroactive or purely 
prospective is a general one in law.165 Yet even beyond its general importance, 
the issue of retroactivity is particularly pressing for patent law because every 
change in patent law potentially implicates existing patents (sometimes tens or 
hundreds of thousands of patents) and thus affects substantial investment- 
based interests as well. In addition, for reasons that this Part will examine, 
patent law is a particularly fertile ground for the application of purely 
prospective lawmaking.
At issue here is not merely the potential for nonretroactive patent deci­
sions, but also the potential for nonretroactive judicial decisions more 
generally. In theory, statutes and regulations can be made to apply purely 
retroactively, purely prospectively, or both retroactively and prospectively.166 
Policymakers in the executive and legislative branches are thus frequently 
faced with the question whether they should “grandfather” existing activities 
or individuals by exempting them from the new legal regime. Not surprisingly, 
nonretroactive laws and regulations are ubiquitous.167 Yet courts issue purely
165. For general discussions of retroactivity across legal fields, see Fisch, supra note 47; and 
Daniel E. Troy, Toward a Definition and Critique of Retroactivity, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1329 
(2000). For discussions of retroactivity in particular contexts, see Michael J. Graetz, 
Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47 
(1977) (tax); Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of 
Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 692 (1960) (legislation); and Stephen R. Munzer, 
A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 425 (1982) (same).
166. See Elmer E. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of 
Jurisprudence, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 775,778 (1936) (“[T]his principle in the English common 
law meant that the courts. . .  viewed themselves as bound by the rule of construction 
that no law should be given an operation from a time prior to its enactment unless 
Parliament had expressly provided that it should have such an effect or unless the 
words of the Act could have no meaning except by application to this past time.” 
(footnote omitted)); Troy, supra note 165, at 1349 (“Unless a statute expressly states an 
intention to apply to pre-enactment transactions, court[s] traditionally apply the 
‘presumption of prospectivity.’”).
167. See generally Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Struggling for Air: Power Plants 
and THE “W ar on Coal” 63-74 (2016) (discussing grandfathering in environmental 
law); Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677 (2007) 
(detailing grandfathering within the administrative state); Steven Shavell, On Optimal 
Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. Legal Stud. 37 (2008) (discussing 
the economic rationales for grandfathering).
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prospective legal rulings only rarely, despite indications from the Supreme 
Court that they are permitted to do so.168 It is time for patent courts to avail 
themselves of this opportunity. Nonretroactive lawmaking is already 
pervasive in environmental law, land use and zoning, and a variety of other 
areas of law that are governed primarily by statute and regulation.169 There is 
no reason to deprive patent policymakers of the tool of prospective lawmaking 
just because those policymakers happen to be judges, rather than legislators or 
executive officials.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Nonretroactive Legal Change
The decision to alter a legal rule—whether by legislation, regulation, or 
judicial decision—is necessarily accompanied by a decision as to whether the 
new rule will affect existing actors and prior conduct, future actors and future 
conduct, or both.170 Put another way, the issue that the legal decisionmaker 
must typically face is whether to “grandfather” some preexisting conduct or 
parties, exempting them from the new legal rule, or to subject everyone and 
everything to the new legal regime.171 Few legal rules are deliberately made 
retrospective only, though some turn out to be largely retrospective in 
effect.172 In most cases, then, the choice is between purely prospective legal 
rules and rules that are both prospective and retrospective.
To concretize the problem, imagine that a policymaker is about to 
implement a new legal rule requiring all factories to install a newer, more 
expensive type of pollution-reducing scrubber on their smokestacks.173 The 
policymaker could be a legislature, an administrative agency, or a court—for 
the moment, the point is general to all of these institutional actors. The new 
rule will apply to every new factory constructed in the future. The question is 
whether, and to what extent, it should also apply to factories that already exist,
168. See infra Part IV.D.
169. See Nash & Revesz, supra note 167, at 1696-705; Shavell, supra note 167, at 69-70.
170. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. Rev. 509, 
511-13(1986).
171. See Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of 
Government Precommitment, 94 MlCH.L.REV. 1129, 1138-43 (1996) (promoting transition 
relief for some changes in the law); Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility 
of Agency Commitments, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1021, 1025, 1041-47 (2007) (explaining that 
grandfathering may be appropriate in order to induce actors to undertake voluntary, 
socially desirable projects); Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty: Strategic 
Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 809,830,842 (2009) (arguing 
for grandfathering from the perspective of governmental legitimacy).
172. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1550-53 (explaining that many patent decisions turn out 
to have only retroactive effect).
173. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 44-50 (discussing and analyzing similar problems and 
questions related to legal change).
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or, conversely, whether some existing factories should be grandfathered and 
allowed to continue using a less expensive and less effective scrubber.
The first and most obvious advantage of making the new rule fully 
retroactive is that it is likely superior to the old rule.174 (If not, it would be odd 
to adopt it.) In this example, perhaps the new scrubbers eliminate more 
pollution than the older models. Thus, the more factories that are forced to 
switch to the new scrubbers, the greater the environmental benefits. Relatedly, 
another reason to make the rule change fully retroactive is to encourage 
regulated parties to anticipate the legal change.175 Suppose that one year before 
the rule change, a firm is constructing a new factory. The new scrubbers exist, 
but they are not yet mandatory. It would be socially optimal if the firm 
installed the new scrubbers rather than the old, but the new scrubbers might be 
more expensive. If policymakers generally do not grandfather existing 
factories, the firm may anticipate that it will be forced to switch to the new 
scrubbers at some point in the near future.176 It may therefore choose to install 
them from the outset. But if the firm believed that its factory may be exempted 
from the new rule, it might instead install the old scrubbers, thus producing 
greater pollution and possibly having to bear the expense of installing the new 
scrubbers a few years later. Lastly, refusing to grandfather existing uses will 
reduce or eliminate lobbying and rent-seeking activity.177 If the policymaker is 
willing to make exceptions to the new rule, existing factories will lobby to 
obtain those potentially valuable exceptions. This activity is socially wasteful. 
But if there is no possibility that a firm will obtain an exception, there is no 
reason to lobby.
On the other hand, though, there are often compelling reasons militating 
in favor of making a legal rule prospective only, or at least in favor of 
grandfathering certain existing activities. First, if every new legal rule is 
applied both prospectively and retroactively, regulated private parties will not 
be able to rely on the continued existence of any particular legal rule. They will 
be reluctant to make new investments that might be derailed or rendered 
worthless by a change in the law. Here, for instance, firms might even resist
174. See Kaplow, supra note 170, at 551-52 (describing the virtues of legal transitions and 
reasons for expediting them).
175. See Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. Rev. 1657,1658-59 
(1999) (suggesting that legal change should be designed to encourage anticipation).
176. See id. at 1673 (describing the public choice dynamics of legal change and firms’ 
behavior).
177. Cf. id. at 1658-59 (analyzing the effects of decisions not to grandfather existing uses on 
political and interest group behavior).
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constructing factories with new scrubbers, fearful that they might soon be 
required to install newer and more expensive scrubbers. This is the rationale 
that applies to patent law with greatest force, for the reasons detailed in Part I 
above.
Second, the new rule may be superior with respect to new activities but 
not existing ones.178 Imagine that the old scrubbers cost SI,000 to install and 
eliminate $2,000 worth of pollution, and that the new scrubbers cost SI,500 to 
install and eliminate $3,000 worth of pollution. It would be socially optimal for 
a new factory to install a new scrubber, which would generate a net benefit of 
$1,500 ($3,000 -  $1,500). But consider a factory that already has an old scrubber 
installed. The marginal increase in benefits from switching to a new scrubber is 
just $1,000 ($3,000 -  $2,000), but the new scrubber would cost $1,500. Forcing 
firms to retrofit and install the new scrubbers is thus inefficient. This may be 
true for patent law as well. For instance, a judicial decision that curtailed 
patenting in some technological field might lead to greater future innovation 
in that field. But it also might harm innovation by existing firms, which would 
cease ongoing R&D if their patents, current and future, instantly became 
unenforceable.179 The optimal balance might be to free firms from the 
constraints imposed by patents in the future while allowing existing patents to 
remain in force.
Third, insisting that a new legal rule be both prospective and retroactive 
may make it more difficult to enact legal change in the first instance. In this 
example, the scrubbers are bad for the firms that must install and pay for them 
but good for society as a whole, which benefits from the reduction in pollution. 
If the policymaker will not grandfather existing uses, the new legal rule will be 
opposed by every firm that owns or contemplates constructing an affected 
factory. The policymaker will be forced to overcome this united resistance to 
enact the new rule.180 However, if the policymaker grandfathers some (or all) 
existing factories, then the owners of those factories will potentially join in 
supporting the new legal rule. Thus, the policymaker can use the possibility of 
nonretroactive lawmaking to pursue a “divide and conquer” strategy that 
makes enactment of the rule more likely in the first instance.181 This is the flip
178. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 47-50 (analyzing the economics of legal rules as applied to 
new and existing uses); see also Masur & Nash, supra note 45, at 396-405 (discussing the 
possibility of transition relief to address inefficiencies that arise when new rules are 
applied to existing activity).
179. See Sichelman, supra note 35, at 354-56 (analyzing firms' incentives to turn existing 
R&D into marketable consumer products).
180. See Levmore, supra note 175, at 1665 (“After all, if new losers simply go uncompensated 
for the burdens new law imposes on them, then they can be expected to work to delay 
the implementation of proposed changes.”).
181. See generally Eric A. Posner et al., Divide and Conquer, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 417 (2010).
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side of the point about avoiding lobbying and rent seeking, described above. 
Rent seeking is usually wasteful, but in some cases, it may be necessary to 
facilitate legal change.
The possibility of rent seeking and the prospect that grandfathering might 
facilitate legal change do not apply with the same force to judicially created 
legal rules, which are the focus of this Article, as they do to legislative or 
agency lawmaking. But they are not entirely irrelevant either. There is 
evidence that courts are influenced by amici, particularly amici who credibly 
argue that a change in a legal rule will do violence to their businesses.182 It is 
not far-fetched to imagine that news stories or public discourse can similarly 
affect judicial decisionmaking. If this is the case, judicial decisionmaking may 
turn out to reflect interest group politics, at least to some degree.
Regardless, the other arguments for and against nonretroactive lawmaking 
and grandfathering apply just as strongly to judicial decisions as they do to 
legislation and regulation. The real question is not the institutional actor but the 
type of legal question. As the foregoing Parts demonstrated, judicial decisions 
frequently implicate reliance interests and ongoing investment in existing assets. 
Of course, this is not to say that legal rules should never be made retroactive—to 
the contrary, most rules likely should be fully retroactive and fully prospective, 
particularly if the quality of legal rules improves over time. Rather, the point is 
that there will be some legal rules that should be implemented only prospective­
ly, and some reliance interests that should be protected with grandfathering. 
Legal policymakers, including courts, should have discretion to make rules 
nonretroactive when it seems appropriate to do so. Accordingly, it is not 
surprising that many laws and regulations include some element of pure 
prospectivity183—that is to say, some element of grandfathering—though others 
are fully retroactive.184
B. Nonretroactive Changes in Patent Law
These arguments for nonretroactivity apply, mutatis mutandis, to patent 
law as well. When judges decide patent cases, they should have the option of 
offering rulings that are purely prospective. That is, they should have the 
authority to grandfather preexisting patents, locking them into the prior legal 
regime that existed before the case at hand was decided. Nonretroactive judicial 
decisions allow for prospective changes in the law without potentially 
upsetting reliance interests or diminishing incentives to invest in R&D.
182. See Chien, supra note 105, at 400-02.
183. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 74 & n.52 (describing some examples of such legal rules).
184. See Levmore, supra note 175, at 1671,1679,1690-93 (identifying examples of retroactive 
lawmaking and proxies thereof, ranging from tobacco company liability to criminal 
law to reparations for past injustices); see also Troy, supra note 165, at 1334-37.
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Nonretroactivity allows judges to change the law without generating the 
negative consequences that animate takings law and the principle of stare 
decisis.
Nonretroactive judicial decisions involve the same advantages and 
disadvantages that typically accompany nonretroactivity. The knowledge that 
courts can protect existing patent rights will increase incentives for firms to 
continue investing in R&D despite the uncertainty surrounding potential legal 
changes.185 A nonretroactive decision, by not impinging on existing patent 
rights, does not upset existing reliance interests and thus does not threaten to 
diminish investment incentives.186 On the other hand, the old rule may be 
inferior to the new rule, and the possibility of being grandfathered may 
discourage patent owners from adapting to the new regime ahead of time.187 
Lastly, while the possibility of grandfathering may induce firms to spend 
resources on “lobbying” the courts for exemptions—through amicus briefs and 
the like—it will also allow judges to amend the law prospectively despite 
opposition in circumstances when the courts would otherwise have stayed 
their hand.
Consider, for example, the rules governing the patentability of business 
methods.188 In 1998, at the very beginning of the internet era, the Federal 
Circuit held that business methods could be patented.189 Within just a few 
years, however, it became clear that the Federal Circuit’s decision was 
misguided.190 As the internet economy exploded, firms began to exploit the 
Federal Circuit’s ruling to obtain patents that covered standard business 
practices.191 Patent trolls began to purchase these types of patents in large
185. See Daniel R. Cahoy, C hanging the Rules in the M iddle o f  the Game: How the Prospective 
Application o f  Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote Economic 
Efficiency, 41 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 37 (2003) (“In view of the economic effects of judicial 
retroactivity on intellectual property interests, it seems that a compelling case can be 
presented for [nonretroactivity].”); supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
186. See Shavell, supra note 167, at 68-69.
187. See supra t e x t  accompanying notes 174-77.
188. The PTO has defined a business method patent as "a patent that claims a method or 
corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in 
the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except 
that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.301(a) (2018).
189. See State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), a f fd  sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
190. See Michael J. Meurer, Business M ethod Patents and Patent Floods, 8 W ash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 
309, 310-14 (2002) (describing the problems caused by the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
State Street and arguing that it should be reversed).
191. See id. at 319-20.
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numbers and use them to extract rents from productive firms.192 Nonetheless, 
the Federal Circuit never revisited its ruling—possibly for fear of upsetting 
reliance interests—and the Supreme Court did not get around to addressing the 
issue until sixteen years had passed.193 If the Federal Circuit had realized its 
ability to change the law prospectively but not retroactively, and thus protect 
existing interests, a solution to the problem of business method patents might 
have come much sooner.
Yet it is not the case that patent decisions should never be retroactive, nor is 
it the case that they should always be retroactive. A corner solution is not called 
for. In deciding whether to make their decisions retroactive, judges should 
consider a range of factors. First, and most obviously, they should consider 
how far superior the new rule is to the old one. The greater the distance in 
quality between new rule and old, the stronger the case for retroactivity.
Second, they should consider the extent to which the putative change in 
patent law will discourage future investment. This inquiry can be decomposed 
into several component parts. One is the degree to which the new rule 
represents a substantial and unexpected change in the law, as opposed to an 
incremental or predictable change in light of prior decisions. The more 
unexpected a legal change, the more that making the change retroactive will 
upset existing reliance interests and affect ongoing R&D decisions.194
Relatedly, courts should consider the degree to which firms’ reliance 
interests will be harmed if a change in the law invalidates existing patents or 
makes it more difficult to obtain future patents. The more that a given decision 
harms existing reliance interests, the more that firms are likely to fear 
decisions that might harm future interests.195 One indicator of potential 
damage to reliance interests is whether private firms have made field- or 
technology-specific investments. The more they have done so, and the more 
difficult it is to reorient those investments in directions that have not been
192. See John M. Golden, Commentary, 'Patent Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 T ex. L. Rev. 
2111, 2112-13 (2007) (describing the business model of patent trolls); David Orozco, 
A dm inistrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN St. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2012) (noting that patent trolls 
“aggressively wield business method patents”).
193. The Supreme Court held nearly all business methods to be unpatentable in Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank International. See 134 S. Ct, 2347, 2360 (2014). The Court had taken a more 
tentative step in the same direction four years earlier in Bilski v. Kappos. See 561 U.S. at 
612-13.
194. See Cahoy, supra note 185, at 18 & nn.65-66; Fisch, supra note 47, at 1092-93.
195. See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, W h a t’s Available?: Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2003) (“Under the availability heuristic, people assess 
probabilities by asking whether examples readily come to mind.”).
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affected by the legal change, the greater the damage to their reliance interests. If 
firms have invested heavily in producing an innovation backed by a particular 
type of patent, that militates against retroactively holding those types of 
patents invalid.
At the same time, the preceding analysis suggests that courts should 
approach retroactivity in an asymmetric fashion. While there is often a strong 
argument in favor of issuing a retroactive decision that invalidates or weakens 
patents, decisions that expand or strengthen patent rights should very rarely 
be made retroactive. First, it is very unlikely that a firm would make an 
investment in reliance on a court changing the law in that firm’s favor in the 
future, particularly given the relatively short time it can take to obtain a patent 
versus the longer time it can take to bring a product to market.196 Betting on a 
change in the law of patentability, for example, makes less sense if the change 
will take place only after the firm has obtained its patents under the old legal 
regime.
Second, if firms are relying on anything, they are relying on existing law, 
not some hypothetical, future improved state of the law. Retroactively 
granting firms more powerful patents than they were expecting is unlikely to 
generate any additional R&D. After all, the firm was willing to make the 
original investment in innovating without any guarantee of patent protection. 
Rather, a retroactive change that strengthens patent rights would more likely 
constitute an unnecessary windfall to existing patentholders. And retroactively 
granting firms broader or more powerful patents can frustrate the reliance 
interests of innovators who have expended firm resources on designing around 
claimed inventions under the belief that their activity was noninfringing.197
Making these determinations may seem like quite a lot to ask of judges— 
especially patent judges, who often make a great show of the fact that they are 
merely interpreting the law and not enacting economic policy.198 Nonetheless,
196. This is particularly the case in the pharmaceutical industry, and Congress’s observation
of this difficulty resulted in the Hatch-Waxman Act, which granted patent term 
extensions to innovator pharmaceutical companies. See Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, sec. 201(a), § 156,98 Stat. 1585, 
1598-602 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2017)); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Since the [Food and Drug Admin­
istration] generally took much longer to approve a[] [new drug application] than the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office took to grant a patent, a manufacturer’s 
patent term was substantially eroded by the time the patentee was able to derive any 
profit from the invention. . . . The Hatch-Waxman Act intended to . . . restore to 
innovators patent time lost during testing and regulatory approval__ ”).
197. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text; supra notes 111-13 and accompanying 
text.
198. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (“Whatever their validity, the 
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political branches of the 
Government, the Congress and the Executive, and not to the courts.”).
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it is clear that patent judges are already considering such factors when they 
make decisions. Indeed, such considerations are part of the everyday process of 
judging: Every time the Federal Circuit considers whether to overrule a 
precedent or to adhere to stare decisis, it is weighing reliance interests—the 
principle underlying stare decisis—against the benefits of switching to a new 
rule.
In fact, it is clear that Federal Circuit judges are consciously evaluating the 
effects of their decisions on reliance interests and investment—they are explicit 
in saying so.199 There have been multiple decisions in which Federal Circuit 
judges have explained that existing interests compel an outcome contrary to 
the one they might have reached had they been writing on a blank slate.200 
None of this is to say that judges are necessarily adept at undertaking these 
types of inquiries; they may lack the necessary institutional capacity for any 
number of reasons.201 But they are already engaged in this enterprise, and 
indeed, because of stare decisis principles, doing so is part of the normal process 
of judging. So long as courts are going to weigh these factors, it makes sense for 
them to do it systematically and with purpose. It also makes sense for this 
aspect of judicial decisionmaking to be explicit in courts’ opinions, so that it 
can be reviewed and evaluated on appeal.
In addition, the need for judges to have the option of rendering nonretro­
active decisions is a function of the mechanisms by which substantive patent 
law is made. Many other areas of federal law—environmental law, securities 
law, and so forth—are governed substantially by statute and regulation.202 
Purely prospective lawmaking is a well-worn tool in the statutory and 
regulatory toolboxes, and one that Congress and administrative agencies use 
frequently.203 Patent law is one of the few areas of federal law where most of
199. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, ]., concurring in part), a ffd  in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
201. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 278-79 (arguing that administrative 
agencies are better equipped than judges to regulate patent law).
202. See id. (contrasting patent law with these other areas of law).
203. See generally, e.g., Nash & Revesz, supra note 167 (discussing the widespread 
grandfathering in Clean Air Act regulations).
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the substantive action takes place in the courts.204 Patent law will be artificially 
hamstrung if the judges who craft it are not permitted to use the tool of purely 
prospective lawmaking.205
In fact, when Congress amends the same rules of patent law that are 
frequently the subject matter of judicial decisions, it will sometimes elect to 
make the new rule prospective only, in a fashion heretofore considered 
unavailable to courts. For instance, the 2011 America Invents Act dramatically 
changed the rules governing priority in patent practice, moving to a “first to 
file” system.206 But those changes were purely prospective: They applied only 
to patents filed eighteen months after the enactment of the law.207 Meanwhile, 
the courts regularly alter the rules governing novelty and patentability 
without discussing the possibility that the new rules should be prospective 
only.208 Similarly, in 2013, the Australian legislature passed a law altering the 
rules governing obviousness, but it provided that the change would apply 
purely prospectively.209 By contrast, when the U.S. Supreme Court made a 
similar change in 2007, that decision was understood to be fully retroactive, 
and the Court offered no discussion of the question.210
At the same time, it is important to note that even if a court decides to 
render a judgment nonretroactive, this will not necessarily protect all of the 
reliance interests involved. For instance, a Firm might invest billions of dollars 
in R&D for a single type of invention, believing that it will be able to obtain
204. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 304 (noting that the courts are “firmly 
ensconced as the expositors of patent law”); see also id. at 304-25 (arguing that the status 
quo should be altered to provide regulatory agencies with more authority over patent 
law).
205. To be sure, judges may not be as adept at utilizing this tool as are legislatures 
and agencies. See Masur, Regulating Patents, supra note 17, at 278-82; supra text 
accompanying notes 166-67. But that is not a reason to deny it to them entirely and to 
thereby restrict the development of patent law.
206. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 3(b)(1), § 102, 125 Stat. 
284,285-87 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2017)).
207. See id. § 3(n)(l), 125 Stat. at 293.
208. See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 64-68 (1998) (redefining what it means for 
an invention to be “on sale”); Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 
1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (deciding, as a matter of first impression, that the prior art need 
not disclose a chemical in order for that chemical to be inherently present in the prior 
art).
209. See Intellectual Property Laws A m endm ent (Raising the Bar) A c t 2012 (Cth) s 2 (Austl.); 
id. s 3 sch 1 pts 1, 3; see also Mark Summerfield, Austra lia’s Four Laws o f  Inventive Step, 
PATENTOLOGY (May 6, 2013,1:25 AM), https://perma.cc/3DRR-UPS8.
210. See KSR Int’I Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407, 415-16 (2007) (rejecting the lower 
court’s “rigid” application of the “teaching, suggestion, and motivation test”); see also, 
e.g., In re Gleizer, 356 F. App’x 415, 421 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that the KSR  decision is 
to be given “full retroactive effect” (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 
86,97(1993))).
1005
Patents, Property, and Prospectivity 
71 Stan. L. Rev. 963 (2019)
patents related to this invention for decades to come. A continuing stream of 
patent-based income may be necessary to justify the R&D costs and permit the 
firm to recoup its investment.211 Grandfathering existing patents will be only a 
partial solution. Equivalently, a firm might have invested billions of dollars in 
R&D, believing that patents in the field are unavailable and that it therefore 
does not risk being excluded by its competitors.212 If the rules change, allowing 
such patents only prospectively may not be enough to protect the firm’s 
investment. But in either case, nonretroactivity will be at least a partial 
solution, and one preferable to a fully retroactive judicial decision.
There are also important connections between takings law and retroactivity. 
By protecting existing rights, purely prospective lawmaking acts as a substitute 
for takings law. It accomplishes the same end—insuring valuable investment 
against legal change213—without the financial costs and negative incentive 
effects that accompany takings.214 In addition, while patents are not currently 
viewed as property that can be judicially taken, that may not always be the 
case.215 This would be normatively undesirable for all of the reasons described 
above.216 But if the law were to evolve in this direction, nonretroactive judicial 
decisions could provide an antidote. A new legal rule that does not apply 
retroactively to a certain set of existing property rights does not constitute a 
taking of those rights. Judges could thus remain free to update the law, purely 
prospectively, without having to worry that their decisions will run afoul of the 
Takings Clause or impose large costs on the federal fisc.
Finally, although patents are functionally similar to other property rights 
in most respects, they are distinct in one critical regard: Patents expire, and 
they do so in a relatively short period of time.217 Expiration changes the 
calculus of the costs and benefits of retroactivity, and makes patent law 
especially conducive to grandfathering.
Suppose that a policymaker exempts a factory from installing a new type 
of scrubber,218 allowing that factory to continue polluting at the rate allowed 
under the old legal rule. This involves some amount of social harm:
211. SeeSichelman, supra note 35, at 360-61 (describing firms’ business plans and the ways in 
which patents are incorporated).
212. See generally Kal Raustiala & CHRISTOPHER Sprigman, T he Knockoff ECONOMY: 
How Imitation Sparks Innovation (2012) (describing many fields in which firms rely 
upon the ability to operate free of intellectual property restrictions).
213. See supra Part IV.A.
214. See supra P art III.A.
215. See supra Parts III.B-.C.
216. See supra P art III.A.
217. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017) (setting the patent term at twenty years from the date of 
filing).
218. See supra Part IV.A.
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The factory is producing more pollution than is socially optimal given the 
availability of existing technology. The continued operation of this factory 
with the old scrubber is a necessary evil, tolerated either because the 
alternative would be even more wasteful or because policymakers wish to 
encourage ongoing investment in the factory’s underlying production.219
The same is true for patents. Suppose a court decides that a particular type 
of invention should not constitute patentable subject matter going 
forward220—perhaps because patents on this type of invention tend to hinder 
innovation more than they further i t 221 It would be tempting for the court to 
invalidate all of the existing patents of this type. After all, the invention has 
already occurred, and now the patents are doing more harm than good.222 But 
in some cases it may be necessary to preserve the existing patents. Invalidating 
them might destroy incentives to commercialize the underlying inventions, or 
harm investment incentives more generally.223 These are the factors a court 
must weigh: the ongoing harm from grandfathering a suboptimal patent, on 
the one hand, and the benefits of encouraging further investment, on the other. 
The court knows, however, that the harm from grandfathering existing 
patents will not last forever. Unlike a factory, which might continue to spew 
excessive levels of pollution for decades, the suboptimal patents will expire 
twenty years from the date of filing, which in most cases is roughly eighteen 
years from when they are granted.224 This means that even if a court 
mistakenly grandfathers some patents whose existence is suboptimal, the harm 
is limited. Those patents will disappear; they will not impose harm 
indefinitely.
Indeed, patents are unusual among legal instruments in this respect. Real 
and chattel property can exist in perpetuity,225 and thus socially suboptimal
219. SeeShavell, supra note 167, at 51-53.
220. C f, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355-60 (2014) (invalidating 
patents that do not contain an “inventive concept” separate from any abstract idea 
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,72 (2012))).
221. See id. at 2354 (‘“[Mjonopolization of [abstract ideas] through the grant of a patent might 
tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,’ thereby thwarting 
the primary object of the patent laws.” (first alteration in original) (quoting M ayo, 566 
U.S. at 71)).
222. Indeed, any given patent could be invalidated on these grounds.
223. See Sichelman, supra note 35, at 360-61 (describing the incentives necessary to promote 
not just development but also commercialization of inventions).
224. A patent is valid for twenty years from the date of filing, see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017), 
and the PTO takes twenty-one months on average to examine a patent once it has been 
granted. See Masur, supra note 108, at 1732 n.149. Subtracting twenty-one months from 
the twenty-year life span of the patent yields eighteen years and three months.
225. See A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS—N atural R ights and a “Polite Form o f  Economic Imperialism ," 29 
Vand.J .T ransnat’l L. 415, 430 (1996) (“Tangible property does not expire, although it 
may be expended.”).
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uses of that property might endure for decades or even centuries. Copyrights 
have finite terms, but those terms are much longer than patent terms and are 
regularly extended.226 Patents, on the other hand, are one of the few legal 
instruments that contain an inherent check on the amount of social harm that 
can accrue if they are exempted from changes in the law. For this reason, 
patent law is an especially good context for nonretroactive lawmaking.
C. The Mechanics of Retroactive and Prospective Lawmaking
We come finally to the question of how, in practical terms, purely pro­
spective judicial decisionmaking would work. Suppose that a patent defendant 
argues that the patent asserted against it in a given case is invalid. Once the 
court has decided whether or not the patent is invalid, how should it go about 
determining whether that decision applies retroactively or only prospectively, 
or even to the case at bar?
1. From habeas to patent law
In implementing purely prospective patent law, courts need not worry 
about reinventing the wheel. There is a model that patent courts could borrow, 
found in the law of federal habeas corpus. Under the doctrine announced by a 
plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane227 and subsequently 
codified by AEDPA,228 a “new rule” of constitutional criminal procedure229 
does not apply to criminal convictions that have already been finalized on 
direct review unless it falls within a recognized exception.230 This means that
226. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,193-94 (2003) (observing that most copyrights “run 
from creation until 70 years after the author’s death” and listing previous copyright 
term extensions approved by Congress); see also 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2017).
227. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
228. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2017) (providing that habeas relief is only available when a 
state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” 
(emphasis added)); see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 104,110 Stat. 1214,1218-19 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
229. By this we mean the doctrines related to the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, 
The Uneasy Relationship Between C rim inal Procedure and C rim inal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 
28,43 (1997) (explaining this categorization).
230. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379-80 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (explaining 
that AEDPA codified Teague’s general bar on retroactivity).
To be clear, we are not necessarily endorsing any aspect of the law of habeas as applied 
to criminal convictions, or arguing that Teague was rightly decided. We offer habeas as 
a model for how courts might treat patent cases, and as a demonstration that the courts 
are already capable of making the types of decisions that such an approach would 
require.
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if a prisoner challenges his conviction with a habeas corpus petition, he cannot 
take advantage of any new rule handed down since his conviction became final 
(that is, when he exhausted his direct appeals). The upshot is that courts’ 
criminal procedure decisions are quasi-prospective—they apply to anyone 
whose case is still pending on direct review, but not to anyone whose 
conviction is already final but who is still pursuing postconviction relief.
The mechanics of postconviction review, at a high level, are straightfor­
ward. The Supreme Court, hearing a criminal case on direct review, issues a 
decision on an issue of constitutional criminal procedure. A subsequent court, 
reviewing a similar issue in the context of a habeas petition, will then decide 
whether the Supreme Court’s ruling applies retroactively to cases on habeas 
review.231 If the subsequent court decides that the Supreme Court has enacted a 
“new rule,” that new rule will not apply to convictions that are challenged 
through habeas (again, unless it falls within a recognized exception).232 Habeas 
cases are adjudicated by the federal district courts and then subsequently by the 
twelve regional circuits.233 Accordingly, the same district courts that handle 
patent cases, as well as every court of appeals save the Federal Circuit, have been 
implementing this type of procedure in the thirty years since Teague was 
decided.
231. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 658-69 (2001) (“Under Cage v. Louisiana, a jury 
instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 
understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In this case, we must decide whether this rule was ‘made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review by the Supreme Court.’” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting 
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (1999)) (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), 
abrogated by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991))).
232. For instance, the Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that all aggravating facts making a defendant eligible for the death penalty be 
found by a jury. See 536 U.S. 584, 597, 609 (2002). The Court then later held that the 
holding of Ring was a new rule and thus did not apply retroactively on habeas review. 
See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004); see also, e.g., Tyler, 533 U.S. at 658-59 
(holding that the constitutional ruling about jury instructions on reasonable doubt 
announced in Cage v. Louisiana did not apply retroactively); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 
383, 388,396-97 (1994) (same for the double jeopardy ruling in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 
U.S. 430 (1981)); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229 (1990) (same for the capital 
sentencing ruling in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).
The two recognized exceptions to the Teague bar are “new substantive rules of 
constitutional law,” such as “‘rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary 
conduct,’ as well as ‘rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of 
defendants because of their status or offense,’” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 
728 (2016) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated in other part by 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)), and “new '“watershed rules of criminal 
procedure” implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding,”’ id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,352 (2004)).
233. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2253(a) (2017).
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Patent courts should adopt a similar procedure. A court that decides a 
patent case should first determine whether it has in fact changed the law— 
whether it has created a “new rule” or merely applied an existing one. This will 
of course be easier in some cases and more difficult in others. But it is not an 
unfamiliar task for judges. Even patent courts must frequently decide whether 
a case created a new rule of law in order to adjudicate collateral questions such 
as whether issue preclusion applies,234 whether a party may amend its 
pleadings,235 or whether to award attorneys’ fees.236
If the rule is not new, it will apply in every case; if the rule is new, the 
court must decide whether it should be applied retroactively or purely 
prospectively, following the considerations related to reliance interests and 
social costs outlined above.
As a practical matter, this means that courts will likely be biased toward 
holding that their rules are not new. Doing so will simplify their decisionmaking 
and reduce their workload.237 In addition, judges tend to insist that they are not 
making new rules, most likely for reasons of institutional perception: 
Legislatures, not courts, are supposed to make new law.238 Accordingly, the 
likely default option will be to treat a judicial decision as merely applying an 
existing rule, and the majority of cases will probably be categorized accordingly.
234. See, e.g., Voter Verified, Inc. v. Election Sys. & Software LLC, 887 F.3d 1376, 1381-82 
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that the “change of law” exception to the application of issue 
preclusion did not apply), cert, denied, No. 18-549, 2019 WL 113159 (U.S. Jan. 7, 2019).
235. See, e.g., Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,1321-22 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (holding that Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International was a sufficient change in 
the law to provide “good cause” under the local rules for the patent infringement 
defendant to amend its invalidity contentions); see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Inti, 
134S.Ct. 2347(2014).
236. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372,1377-80 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017) (affirming an award of attorneys’ fees where the defendant argued that the 
plaintiff should have given up prosecution of the case after Alice was decided because 
the legal landscape had changed). That is not to say that courts will not sometimes try 
to duck the question whether a particular decision created a new rule. In Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc. v. Dickstein Shapiro LLP, for instance, the district court held that the 
patentholder’s malpractice case could not succeed because even if the defendant law 
firm had rendered deficient performance, the subsequent Alice decision would have 
invalidated the patent anyway. See 128 F. Supp. 3d 103, 110-12, 116 (D.D.C. 2015), a ffd  
per curiam, 653 F. App’x 764 (D.C. Cir. 2016). To justify this holding, the court decided 
that Alice did not change the law—contrary to the Federal Circuit's view in First Choice 
Loan and Inventor Holdings. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 128 F. Supp. 3d at 110-11; see also 
David Hricik, Update: I f  Alice W as A lw ays the Law, W h y  Did You Get So M any  “Invalid” 
Patents fo r  Your Clients?, Patently-0  (Sept. 26,2016), https://perma.cc/YV7X-K7BG.
237. Cf. Bronsteen, supra note 117, at 535-36 (analyzing the effects of judicial asymmetries in 
the context of summary judgment).
238. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (insisting that legal policymaking 
is a matter for Congress); see also infra  Part IV.D.
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If a court decides that it has created a new legal rule, the last remaining 
question is whether the rule should be fully retroactive and prospective, or 
merely prospective.239 The court that creates the new rule could decide this 
question as well, but it is not necessary for it to do so. It could leave the issue 
open and allow a subsequent litigant—who wishes the rule to be applied 
retroactively—to raise it before a future court.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. The court that 
first issues the new legal ruling may understand the rule best and have already 
done the hard work of thinking through the costs and benefits of its approach. 
It may be best situated to decide whether the rule should be applied 
retroactively. On the other hand, a subsequent court would have the advantage 
of having observed reactions to the new legal rule and assessed its operation, 
which might provide valuable information regarding whether the rule should 
be applied retroactively. And the ability to outsource the decision on 
retroactivity to another court may make judges more inclined to issue new 
legal rules, thereby advancing the law in beneficial ways. We take no position 
on the overall question of which approach is best. Both are consistent with the 
more general goal of permitting courts to engage in nonretroactive 
lawmaking.
In sum, the process for deciding the retroactive effect of patent cases would 
mirror the procedure that courts already employ in habeas cases, with only one 
salient difference. While new rules of criminal procedure are almost always 
made purely prospective in the context of habeas, patent courts would have the 
authority to decide whether any new rule should be retroactive.
It is worth noting that the purposes behind the Teague rule even mirror the 
purposes of nonretroactive patent law that we describe here. As Justice 
Kennedy later explained, the purpose of the Teague rule was to allow federal
239. As we will describe in greater detail below, the Supreme Court has held that courts 
may only make a prospective rule if they do not apply the new rule to the parties before 
the court. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,97-98 (1993); in fra  Part IV.D. 
Accordingly, a court has only two choices: (1) apply the decision fully retroactively 
and  prospectively; or (2) apply it only prospectively, and not to the parties in the 
current case.
There is a downside to the Supreme Court’s approach. If the courts do not always apply 
legal rules to the cases in which they are decided, litigants will have less of an incentive 
to argue for legal change, thus slowing the pace of the law’s development. See Malani & 
Masur, supra note 26, at 668-69 (analyzing private incentives to produce public goods 
through litigation). Litigants might also try harder than usual to frame their arguments 
as mere extensions of existing law, rather than as new legal rules, further distorting the 
process of argument and decision. In addition, a newly announced legal rule would 
technically be mere dicta if it did not apply to the case at hand. Regardless, these are 
relatively minor concerns when measured against the potential legal gains from 
issuing purely prospective rulings. And until the Supreme Court revisits Harper, it is 
not as if the lower courts have any other choice.
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courts to change the law of criminal procedure without overturning thousands 
of existing convictions each time they did so.240 If every criminal procedure 
decision were necessarily fully retroactive, courts might refrain from making 
necessary changes to the law for fear of the consequences.241 And when they 
did alter the law, the retroactive harms might outweigh the prospective 
benefits. As we have explained, these considerations apply with even greater 
force to patent law.242
If a court decides to make a new rule of patent law nonretroactive, the rule 
should apply only to patents that were filed after the date of the ruling.243 This 
cutoff is to some extent arbitrary—the rule could just as easily be applied to 
patents granted after the date of the ruling, or to inventions that were 
conceived or reduced to practice or published after the date of the ruling, or 
some other such moment in the patent lifecycle. But the filing date is 
administratively easy to observe, and it serves as a rough proxy of the moment 
when a reliance interest attaches.244 After all, a patent application is drafted to
240. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. I l l , 307-09 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).
241. See id.
242. A full evaluation of the Teague rule as applied to habeas is well beyond the scope of this 
Article. We pause only to note that every time a court applies Teague in a criminal 
procedure case, it creates an injustice by leaving in prison an individual who might 
otherwise never have been convicted if the new rule had been in place. For this reason, 
there are good arguments for overturning Teague as applied to habeas. No such concern 
is present in patent law, of course, where only intellectual property rights—rather than 
individuals’ lives and liberty—are at stake.
243. By “filing,” we mean here the regular U.S. filing date, not the priority filing date of the 
patent application. In U.S. patent prosecution practice, a “continuation” application can 
claim the priority date of a prior provisional or regular U.S. patent application, tracing 
that priority back through as many earlier continuation applications as exist in the 
patent family. See 4 JOHN GLADSTONE M ills III ET AL., Pa t e n t  La w  Fund a m entals 
§ 15:7 (West 2d ed. 2019). When the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court makes a new 
rule, that rule should apply immediately to new patent applications that are filed, 
regardless of whether those applications claim priority to applications that were filed 
before the new rule. When a firm files a patent application, even a continuation 
application, it does so with full knowledge of existing law. Reliance concerns are weak, 
even for applications that relate to prior patents. This approach would eliminate 
patentees’ ability to game the system by filing for continuation patents years or even 
decades after an unfavorable judicial decision. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2017) (providing 
applicants the right to claim priority to patent applications filed earlier); 4 MILLS ET al., 
supra, § 15:7; see also id. (“Under present practice, there is no limit to the number of prior 
applications through which a chain of continuing applications may be traced to obtain 
the benefit of the filing date of the earliest of a chain of prior continuing applications.”).
244. Here, too, there is a concern related to symmetry as between patents and firms’ 
freedom to operate. It is straightforward to make nonretroactive a decision reducing 
the scope of patents or patentability. That decision simply has to be held not to apply to 
patents that have already been applied for or granted, as described above. It is less 
straightforward to make nonretroactive a decision that expands the scope or power of
footnote continued on next page
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comport with existing law, and only the claims can be amended after filing.245 
Changes to the law subsequent to the initial application filing can trap the 
applicant, to the detriment of that firm and the patent system as a whole.246
2. Forum-based prospectivity
There is a potential extension of this approach that borrows even more 
explicitly from the law of habeas. There are two contexts in which federal 
courts consider questions of constitutional criminal procedure: direct review of 
criminal convictions and habeas (collateral) review.247 Under Teague, federal 
courts are generally barred from applying new legal rules to criminal cases on 
habeas review, but they must apply those rules to cases on direct review.248 
In addition, Teague generally bars the federal courts from creating new legal 
rules in habeas cases 249 Rather, a federal court is only permitted to alter the 
law when deciding a case on direct review.
The Federal Circuit similarly considers questions of patent law in two 
contexts: appeals from  the district courts arising out o f infringem ent litigation
patents. In such a case, the thing that must be protected is a firm’s ability to operate 
outside of the realm of patents, rather than existing patents themselves. If a court 
decides not to apply a new legal rule to existing patents, that will not necessarily 
function as meaningful grandfathering of the existing activity, because there are likely 
few relevant existing patents in the first place. Instead, to reinforce the nonretroactive 
effects of their decisions, courts should consider issuing new legal rules but delaying 
the onset of those rules for a period of several years. These types of “sunrise clauses” are 
typical in legislation and regulation. See generally Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh 
Grewal, Make Me Democratic, but Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitu­
tionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1975 (2015) (describing the operation of “sunrise” and 
“sunset” clauses across a variety of legal domains). It is even relatively common for 
courts to use stays of this sort when it is necessary to give the affected parties time 
to adjust or prepare to implement a decision. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 
934-35,942 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding an Illinois ban on carrying firearms ready for use to 
be unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, but staying the mandate for 
180 days "to allow the Illinois legislature to craft a new gun law”). Patent courts should 
embrace this practice.
245. See Michael Risch, A Brief Defense of the Written Description Requirement, 119 Yale L.J. 
Online 127,129-30 (2010).
246. See Schwartz, supra note 67, at 1553-55 (explaining how retroactive patent decisions can 
harm patent applicants who have drafted patents with existing law in mind).
247. See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
643,667-68 (2015).
248. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (“Under the Teague framework, an 
old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally 
applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.”).
249. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315-16 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) (2017) (explaining that habeas relief is unavailable unless the state court’s 
decision was contrary to clearly established federal law).
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and challenges to issued patents,250 and direct appeals from patent prosecution 
in the PTO.251 Direct appeals from patent prosecutions are analogous to direct 
review of criminal cases—the patent has not yet been issued or finalized.252 
Appeals of district court litigation and inter partes review have the same flavor 
as habeas review, in the sense that they involve collateral attacks on existing 
patents.
Accordingly, we could imagine another version of prospectivity that 
applies the habeas rules even more strictly to patent law. Under this approach, 
the federal courts would be barred from creating new rules of patent law in 
appeals from district court infringement litigation, and possibly also in appeals 
from inter partes review and ex parte reexamination (the collateral context). 
They would be permitted to create new rules only in the context of direct 
appeals from PTO decisions in patent prosecutions and in post-grant reviews 
(the direct review context). These new rules would then only apply to patents 
that are pending before the PTO or filed after the date of the decision.
For example, this approach would have barred the courts from announcing 
a new rule of patentability in Ass’n fo r  Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc.253 That case arose from district court litigation, which we have 
analogized to collateral review.254 But the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court 
could have announced the same rule in connection with an appeal from a denied 
patent or a post-grant review.255 The new rule would then apply to any case 
appealed directly from the PTO, and to all patents (in litigation and otherwise) 
whose applications were filed after the rule was announced.
This approach eliminates much of the judicial discretion embodied in the 
procedure we discussed above.255 New rules could only be created in certain 
cases, and those new rules would never be applied retroactively to patents that
250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). We would include in this category appeals from the PTO’s 
decisions in inter partes review—a PTO-based proceeding in which a third party can 
challenge a patent—because these decisions are so closely connected to litigation. 
See S. Rep. No . 110-259, at 20 (2008) (describing inter partes review as "a quick, 
inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court litigation”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311 
(2017).
251. This includes appeals from frustrated patent applicants whose applications the PTO 
has denied. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).
252. This is not quite true for challenges arising out of post-grant review proceedings, 
which involve very recently issued patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). In those cases, 
however, the issue is whether the patent should have been granted in the first place, 
and the only questions relate to validity, so it is as if the patent is not yet 'final.
253. 569 U.S. 576 (2013); see supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
254. See M yriad, 569 U.S. at 586.
255. Patents can be challenged for lack of patentable subject matter—the legal issue in 
M yriad, see id. at 589-90—in post-grant review. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b).
256. See supra Part IV.C.l.
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had already been granted and were now the subject of litigation. The advantage 
of this alternative lies in the greater certainty it would provide to patent 
plaintiffs and defendants regarding when and how the law might be changed. 
The parties to a patent litigation would know precisely what legal rules would 
apply in their case, and they could be confident that those rules would remain 
unchanged.
This alternative comes with downsides, however. The Federal Circuit 
hears roughly equal numbers of patent cases on (direct) appeal from the PTO 
and on (collateral) appeal from the district courts. (The former figure includes 
appeals from inter partes review, which we view as a species of collateral 
attack.)257 Barring the Federal Circuit (and the Supreme Court) from making 
new legal rules in any case on appeal from the district courts could thus 
eliminate significant opportunities for the courts to update the law. Moreover, 
many important patent law issues arise only in the context of infringement 
litigation—questions related to infringement,258 damages,259 and injunctive 
relief,260 among many others. At minimum, therefore, it would be necessary to 
permit courts to alter these doctrinal rules in the context of litigation. Finally, 
implementing this alternative would require either legislation or new law 
from the Supreme Court.261 In contrast, the more discretionary proposal we 
described in Part IV.C.l above is permissible under existing Supreme Court 
precedent, as we will explain below. For these reasons, we do not necessarily 
recommend this alternative approach. We merely present it as a potential 
extension of our habeas-based model of prospective judicial lawmaking.
257. See U.S. Courts, Table B-8: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Appeals Filed, 
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2017 (n.d.), 
https://perma.cc/FVF8-TBL9; see also supra note 250.
258. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736-37 
(2002) (setting forth the rules for when prosecution history estoppel applies). 
See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. Rev. 
187 (2011) (describing and analyzing rules related to indirect infringement liability).
259. See, e.g., LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Comput., Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 56 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(addressing a number of questions related to patent damages). See generally Erik 
Hovenkamp & Jonathan Masur, How Patent Damages Skew  Licensing M arkets, 36 Rev. 
Litig. 379 (2017) (explaining how the Federal Circuit’s licensing rules affect the use and 
value of patents); Masur, supra note 109 (describing and analyzing the Federal Circuit’s 
rules on using existing licenses as the basis for assessing patent damages).
260. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390-91 (2006) (holding that 
patent owners must satisfy a four-factor test in order to obtain an injunction).
261. Under current law, courts are of course permitted to make new legal rules in the 
context of patent litigation. See, e.g., M yriad, 569 U.S. at 580, 586 (making new law 
governing the patentability of natural substances); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72-73, 75-76 (2012) (making new law governing the 
patentability of laws of nature). Congress or the Supreme Court could change this 
longstanding rule, but the lower courts could not do it of their own accord.
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D. The Law of Nonretroactivity
Given the many advantages of purely prospective legal change, there are 
compelling reasons to permit courts to decide whether to apply their decisions 
retroactively. Indeed, the Supreme Court has largely allowed the practice, 
subject to one restriction. In a series of cases culminating in Harper v. Virginia 
Department o f Taxation, the Court held that when it
applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling 
interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases 
still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such events 
predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.262
Thus, by implication, courts remain free to issue purely prospective 
rulings, so long as they do not apply those rulings to the parties who brought 
the case. That might seem at first glance to be a tendentious reading of the 
Court’s opinion. But in fact, multiple courts of appeals have interpreted Harper 
in precisely this fashion.265 As we noted earlier, the fact that the decision could 
not be applied to the parties to the instant lawsuit may dampen litigants’ 
incentives to raise genuinely new legal theories.264 But this is a marginal 
consideration. Far more important is the fact that patent courts currently 
possess the authority to render purely prospective decisions in cases that 
warrant such an approach.265
The appellate courts’ interpretations to the side, some readers might have 
the intuition that allowing courts to make purely prospective legal rules raises
262. 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); see also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 
532-34 (1991) (opinion of Souter, J.) (noting that an earlier holding that interstate 
discrimination in alcohol taxes violated the Commerce Clause applied retroactively to 
facts antedating the Court’s decision); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. ET al., Hart and 
W echsler’s T he Federal Courts and the Federal System 54-55 (7th ed. 2015) 
(describing the law of retroactivity).
263. See, e.g., Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ( [A] court 
announcing a new rule of law must decide between pure prospectivity and full 
retroactivity... .”); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86,93 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A court in a civil case 
may apply a decision purely prospectively, binding neither the parties before it nor 
similarly situated parties in other pending cases, depending on the answers to three 
questions.”); Glazner v. Glazner, 347 F.3d 1212,1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“Although 
prospectivity appears to have fallen into disfavor with the Supreme Court, the Court 
has clearly retained the possibility of pure prospectivity . . . .  (citation omitted)), see also 
1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law  § 3-3, at 226 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“[T]he Court has not renounced the power to make its decisions entirely prospective, so 
that they do not apply even to the parties before it.”). B ut cf. Daniel Hemel, There Is No 
Retroactivity Concern w ith Overruling Quill, Medium (Jan. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc 
/YH87-MU53 (suggesting that the question whether the Court believes prospectivity is 
allowed is somewhat unsettled).
264. See supra note 239.
265. The Court has created a similar rule to govern criminal cases. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 
479 U.S. 314,324-25(1987).
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Article III concerns. The idea is that Article III grants the federal courts only 
“judicial Power,” not legislative power.266 Judicial power is authority to find, or 
interpret, law that has been made by some other body, such as the legisla­
ture.267 It does not comprise the power to “make” new law. On this reading, 
purely prospective legal rulemaking, in which a court declares that the law is 
now different than it was before, would be a constitutionally impermissible 
exercise of legislative power.268
Indeed, the language of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity decisions reveals 
concerns of this nature. As Justice Thomas wrote for the Court in Harper, ‘“the 
nature of judicial review’ strips us of the quintessential^ ‘legislative]’ 
prerogative to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.”269 
The Harper majority described this principle as a legal axiom, antecedent to the 
Constitution itself, rather than grounded in the Constitution’s text.270 Justice 
Scalia’s concurrence expressed a similar sentiment, rooted instead in 
Article III.271 In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, a precursor to Harper, 
Justice Scalia had similarly explained:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be unaware that judges 
in a real sense “make” law. But they make it as judges make it, which is to say as 
though they were “finding” it—discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing 
what it is today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.272
Yet this approach to the law does not pose a barrier to nonretroactive 
judicial patent decisions, even if it might be seen as barring nonretroactive 
decisions in other contexts. Congress passes patent laws under its authority 
“Mo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
266. See U.S. CONST, art. Ill, § 1.
267. On this account, courts merely “find” the law, in the sense that they uncover what the 
law means (and has always meant). When a court changes the law, it is merely 
correcting past judicial mistakes. It is not actually making new law; that is a legislative 
task. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. 
L.Rev. 1,65 n.279 (1985) (attributing this view of courts to Blackstone).
268. One could also imagine an argument that a purely prospective decision might raise 
concerns that the court is offering an advisory opinion, which would similarly violate 
Article III. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 262, at 54-55. But this particular concern has no 
force. An advisory opinion is one that does not resolve the case before the court. 
A purely prospective new legal rule would still result in a decision that resolved the 
case before the court—it would merely do so according to the old legal rule. That would 
not constitute an advisory opinion.
269. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322).
270. See id. at 94.
271. See id. at 106 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The true traditional view is that prospective 
decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power.. . .”).
272. 501 U.S. 529,549 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Writings and Discoveries.”273 Patent laws exist in order to promote the 
progress of science—that is their animating purpose. Accordingly, courts 
should interpret patent statutes—which are often written in very general 
terms—in light of this constitutional purpose. Of course, as we have noted, 
technology and markets change dramatically over time.274 The set of legal 
rules that best promoted the progress of science in 1968 may not be especially 
effective at promoting progress in 2018, and vice versa. This means that one 
interpretation of the patent laws might have been “correct” in 1968, and 
another version might be “correct” in 2018, without the text of the law itself 
ever having changed. A court that reinterpreted the law in 2018 but did not 
apply the new rule retroactively would not be making new law; it would 
merely be finding the law as it should be understood in contemporary times.275 
It is in this respect that patent law is potentially atypical: The constitutional 
provision that authorizes Congress to make law demands that the law be 
updated (by Congress or the courts) in a forward-looking manner.
This is particularly true for areas of law that are explicitly driven by 
judicial lawmaking. For instance, the Federal Circuit has described the rule that 
laws of nature, abstract ideas, and natural phenomena are not patentable 
subject matter as a “judicially-crafted exception[].”276 If the courts have the 
authority to craft such an exception—and they undoubtedly do—then they 
similarly have the authority to apply it only prospectively if they so choose.277
In addition, suppose that the Federal Circuit were to issue a decision in 
2018 that changed a particular patent rule from Rule X  to Rule Y. Even if the 
court were merely finding law, and even if this decision meant that Rule 7 had 
always been correct, and Rule A had always been incorrect, this does not mean
273. U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
274. See supra  text accompanying note 83.
275. See William Baude, Essay, Is O rig ina lism  O u r Law?, 115 COLUM. L. Rev. 2349, 2356 (2015) 
(“At a most basic level, it does not take any fancy theoretical footwork to see that fixed 
texts can harness what seem to be changing meanings. Though the text may have 
originally been expected to apply in a particular way to a particular circumstance, that 
does not mean that its original meaning always must apply in the same way—  This is 
because a word can have a fixed abstract meaning even if the specific facts that meaning 
points to change over time.”).
276. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also 
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-02 (2010) (“The Court’s precedents provide three 
specific exceptions to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: ‘laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’ While these exceptions are not required by 
the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable process must be 
‘new and useful.’ And, in any case, these exceptions have defined the reach of the statute 
as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.” (citation omitted) (first 
quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); and then quoting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101)).
277. We thank Judge Kimberly Ann Moore for suggesting this point to us.
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that the court would be obligated to apply Rule Y  retroactively. Federal courts 
have the authority to tailor their remedies pragmatically.278 In such a case, the 
Federal Circuit could decide that even though the correct rule has always been 
Rule Y, it will not apply Rule Y  to parties that have already applied for patents 
under Rule X. The pragmatic reason would be the reliance interests held by 
those parties, the same rationale that animates stare decisis and leads courts to 
adhere to potentially suboptimal rules over time.279 Thus, even courts or 
scholars who hold a formalistic view of Article III should not balk at the idea of 
nonretroactive patent decisions.
What is more, there are good reasons to reject such a formalistic view of 
the judicial role. Ever since the legal realists, sophisticated legal observers have 
understood that the courts make law, just as legislatures and agencies do.280 
The notion that the courts only “find” what law the other branches have made 
is a legal fiction that fools few educated observers and is routinely contravened 
in public by other judges.281 Perhaps it is politically expedient for courts to 
maintain that they do not make new law, but even if so, it is a strategy that is 
becoming less and less useful each day.282 More importantly, it lacks the virtue 
of being true. As a descriptive matter, this could well be why the Supreme
278. See generally Aaron Tang & Fred 0. Smith Jr., Response, Can Unions Be Sued fo r  
Following the Law?, 132 Harv. L. Rev. F. 24 (2018) (responding to William Baude & 
Eugene Volokh, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term —C om m ent Compelled Subsidies and the 
First Am endm ent, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 171 (2018)) (discussing the courts’ authority to make 
prospective rulings, describing why courts might choose to do so, and providing 
examples of instances in which courts have effectively made purely prospective rules).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
280. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. Rev. 809, 841 (1935) (“[T]he problem of the judge is not whether a legal rule or 
concept actually exists but whether it o u g h tto  exist.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism  
About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1235-36 (1931) 
(responding to Roscoe Pound, The Call f o r  a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697 
(1931)) (describing as a core realist belief “[t]he conception of law in flux, of moving 
law, and of judicial creation of law”).
281. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 81 (2008) (“Appellate judges are 
occasional legislators.” (emphasis omitted)).
282. This notion is somewhat akin to Chief Justice Roberts’s famous statement during his 
confirmation hearings that his role as a judge was merely to “call balls and strikes,” 
a claim that was roundly criticized as disingenuous and implausible. See, e.g., Todd E. 
Pettys, The M yth  o f  the W ritten  Constitution, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 991, 995, 1047 
(2009) (calling Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy “unfortunate”); see also Confirm ation  
Hearing on the N om ination o f  John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be C h ie f Justice o f  the U.Sc Hearing Before 
the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., 
Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United States).
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Court has expressed concern about courts being granted unencumbered 
authority to issue prospective or retrospective decisions as they see fit.283 But as 
a normative matter, it does not offer grounds for doubting prospective judicial 
lawmaking.284
Indeed, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution effectively requires 
prospective judicial lawmaking with respect to substantive criminal law.285 
The Ex Post Facto Clause is based upon the principle “that persons have a right 
to fair warning of that conduct which will give rise to criminal penalties” and 
thus cannot be convicted under a rule of law that did not exist at the time they 
engaged in the conduct in question.286 The Clause applies only to Congress, but 
the Court has extended and applied the same principle to judicial decisions via 
the Due Process Clause.287 This means that any judicial decision that broadens 
the scope of criminal liability—by limiting a constitutional protection, for 
instance—is necessarily prospective only, applying only to conduct that occurs 
after the Court’s decision is announced.288 This of course precisely parallels our 
proposed approach to patent law. And here, the legislative nature of purely 
prospective judicial rulings has not troubled the Court.
The Court’s view of nonretroactive judicial decisionmaking is also 
incongruous with the law of habeas corpus. In the realm of habeas and criminal 
procedure, rulings that apply to the parties to the lawsuit but not retroactively 
are not merely permitted but required.289 That is, if a criminal defendant on 
direct review persuades a court to create a new legal rule, that new legal rule 
will always apply to that criminal defendant.290 But it typically will not apply
283. See supra text accompanying note 262.
284. The Harper majority also suggested that applying a rule of decision to the parties in a 
case but not retroactively would “violate!] the principle of treating similarly situated 
[parties] the same.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (quoting 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987)). But this concern is similarly unfounded. 
Similarly situated parties are often treated differently based upon when or where their 
cases are heard and adjudicated, with no hint that this might raise constitutional 
problems. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 359-61, 364-65 
(1932) (holding, in a case where the Montana Supreme Court had issued a fully 
prospective statutory interpretation ruling, that due process did not demand applica­
tion of that ruling to the litigant who had actually obtained it). It is hard to imagine a 
reason why differentiation on the basis of litigation timing would be acceptable, but 
differentiation on the basis of when the underlying right was created would not be.
285. See U.S. CONST, art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
286. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,191-92 (1997).
287. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347,362 (1964).
288. See M arks, 430 U.S. at 192.
289. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
290. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 
302-05 (1989) (plurality opinion) (criticizing the earlier retroactivity regime wherein 
new rules were not applied to all cases still pending on direct review).
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retroactively to habeas petitioners who remain in the custody of the state.291 
More generally, when the Supreme Court recognizes a rule of criminal 
procedure, it must then subsequently declare whether the rule is “new” or 
merely derives from an existing rule.292 For a Court that seems invested in the 
idea that only legislatures create new, prospective laws, this is an odd 
posture.293
Perhaps paradoxically, the “legislative” nature of prospective rules should 
serve as a signal of their value, rather than a cause for concern. In areas of law 
governed by statute and regulation, policymakers have long benefitted from 
the flexibility to create nonretroactive legal rules. Patent law has not enjoyed 
this flexibility, precisely because the relevant legal rules are created by judges 
rather than legislatures and agencies.294 Yet the federal courts do not lack the 
power to make purely prospective legal rules—the Supreme Court has 
approved the practice. The federal courts thus suffer not from a failure of
291. See, e.g., Sum m erlin, 542 U.S. at 358.
292. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (plurality opinion).
293. It is possible to construct an argument that Teague mirrors how courts address other 
areas of law. For instance, if a court decides an employment law case at time ft, and at a 
later time f2 the Supreme Court makes a change to employment law doctrine, the first 
court will not (and cannot) reopen the decision at That decision is final. This is the 
general rule across essentially every area of law. See Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v. 
United States, 886 F.3d 1215, 1223 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (describing the general rule of 
finality in civil litigation). Thus, if one thinks of a criminal conviction that has become 
final on direct review as akin to a final decision in any other legal field, the rule of 
Teague regarding nonretroactive criminal procedure rules appears congruent with the 
rest of the law. This is because most legal rulings are nonretroactive as to cases that 
have already been decided, though not as to conduct that has already occurred.
The flaw in this approach is the formalism of defining a criminal conviction as final 
once the prisoner has exhausted his or her direct appeals. In fact, a conviction that is 
final on direct appeal is neither legally final—because of the possibility of habeas 
relief—nor substantively final—because the prisoner suffers the ongoing harm of 
incarceration. Teague only looks like other areas of the law if one artificially defines a 
conviction as final when direct appeals are exhausted. Moreover, Teague forces 
courts to act in ways that contradict the Supreme Court’s general posture toward 
retroactivity, as described in the main text.
294. The rare exceptions are the few patent rules created through regulation by the PTO. 
Those rules are frequently only prospective in application. For instance, in October 
2018 the PTO announced that it was changing the claim construction standard it would 
use in inter partes review, post-grant review, and covered business method proceed­
ings. See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial 
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,340, 
51,358-59 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 42.200). The PTO made the new 
rule prospective: It applies only to petitions for review filed on or after November 13, 
2018, the effective date of the rule. See id. at 51,340.
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authority, but from a failure of imagination. The time has come for courts to 
extend the practice of prospective lawmaking beyond the realm of habeas to 
other areas of law.295 Patent law is especially fertile ground for such an 
extension.
Conclusion
When the courts alter patent law, they upset existing reliance interests and 
undermine the settled expectations of patent owners. This can dissuade firms 
from engaging in R&D in the first place and lead to an overall decline in 
innovation. Perhaps more importantly, courts are aware of these concerns, 
which can make them reluctant to enact significant legal change. Indeed, the 
principle of stare decisis is based in part around the idea that courts should 
avoid upsetting reliance interests. Courts that fear doing violence to settled 
expectations can (and do) stay their hands, to the detriment of the law’s 
development.
The solution to this problem is not for courts to refrain from updating the 
law. Rather, the solution is for judges to be afforded the authority to make 
purely prospective changes to the law, effectively grandfathering existing 
patents (or patent-free zones). Doing so would permit brisk legal change 
without fear of harming expectation-based investments. And because patents 
expire twenty years after filing, “old” patents that have been grandfathered 
would soon exit the scene. The U.S. Supreme Court has permitted prospective 
decisionmaking in other contexts, despite concerns for its institutional 
reputation. The time has come for lower courts—and the Federal Circuit in 
particular—to accept the Supreme Court’s invitation. Patent law and its 
stakeholders stand to benefit greatly from the change.
295. Indeed, habeas itself may in many respects be a poor candidate for nonretroactive 
rulings. See Kendall Turner, Note, A New Approach to the Teague Doctrine, 66 STAN. 
L. Rev. 1159, 1171-75 (2014) (criticizing the application of Teague in many habeas 
contexts).
1022
Copyright of Stanford Law Review is the property of Stanford Law Review and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
